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ABSTRACT 
Warfare in the 21st century has matured to the point where military technology 
and force are no longer the keys to victory. Today’s warfare has become a war of 
ideas. Success in war now means winning the “hearts and minds” of citizens to 
prevent them from becoming radicalized. The research question posed is how 
can the United States effectively fight the “war of ideas,” and can it develop its 
own counter-strategic strategy? Utilizing the case study method aspects of the 
United Kingdom’s counter radicalization PREVENT strategy were examined. 
Based on this research, a U.S. policy model is proposed where the United States 
develops its own counter-radicalization strategy. The findings of this research 
show that a U.S. counter-radicalization strategy should be implemented. 
However, it would be carried out at the local level(i.e., mayor’s offices and/or 
governor’s offices). It will require the coordinated effort of several federal 
agencies to establish programs to address radicalization factors. The findings 
propose that this coordination be carried out by an appointed “Counter 
radicalization Czar” through the Department of Homeland Security. The “Czar” 
would have intra-departmental authority to coordinate federal agencies to 
promote and provide programs that address counter radicalization factors that 
make individuals susceptible to the terrorist message. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Warfare in the 21st century has matured to the point where military technology 
and force are no longer the keys to victory. Parties in conflict during the twentieth 
century had begun to realize that success in war meant winning the “hearts and 
minds” of the people and, to an extent, the enemy forces. Today’s warfare has 
become a war of ideas.  
Faced with this unique type of threat, the United States lacks a coherent 
domestic counter-radicalization strategy to fight this new type of warfare. In order 
to neutralize it, the United States must develop a counter-messaging strategy to 
“reinforce, integrate, and complement public communication efforts” that focuses 
on countering the rhetoric of al-Qa’ida, its affiliates and adherents, other 
international terrorist organizations and violent extremists overseas.  
Thus, the problem statement involves communication efforts: how can the 
United States effectively fight the “war of ideas,” and can it develop its own 
counter-strategic strategy in order to address al-Qa’ida’s rhetoric? A possible 
solution would be for the United States to engage in counter radicalization 
through creating counter-terrorist messaging and providing programs that target 
those individuals who may be susceptible to the terrorist message. To begin, the 
United States would benefit from examining a current national counter-
radicalization strategy that has proven to be successful and to utilize that strategy 
and techniques within its own. One such national strategy that has been 
successful is the United Kingdom’s (UK) counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST), 
specifically the PREVENT element. This research studied the PREVENT element 
in detail and determined that some aspects of it are applicable to the U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts.  
The UK’s PREVENT program in 2006 was a commendable effort in that it 
sought to address and prevent radicalization at a grassroots level. The United 
Kingdom recognized that in addition to the battlefields their military was fighting 
 xi 
on in the Middle East, they also recognized there was a battlefield at home as 
well. However, much like the first radical action taken in any effort, it was viewed 
as a good attempt, but its practical effect was negligible. It resulted in revisions. 
The result of these revisions led to the creation of PREVENT 2011 that 
addressed the limitations of PREVENT 2006 that (1) had focused too narrowly on 
the Muslim community, (2) was accused of being a vehicle for spying on 
communities, (3) misallocated funding, (4) lacked an effective integration 
strategy, and (5) failed to address radicalization overseas, especially in North 
and West Africa.  
A U.S. PREVENT Strategy begins with the realization that the United 
States, like the UK, faces a range of terrorist threats both domestic and 
internationally. The most serious threat is from al-Qa’ida, its affiliates, and 
likeminded organizations. These groups also seek to radicalize and recruit 
people within America to their cause. While the percentage of Americans who 
are prepared to support violent extremism in the United States is small, it is 
significantly higher among young people. During the last decade, the United 
States has acquired knowledge about radicalization. It has gained experience 
regarding the factors that encourage people to support terrorism, and then for 
those radicalized individuals to carry out the terrorism-related activity. Therefore, 
it becomes imperative to understand these factors to prevent radicalization in 
order to minimize the risks it poses to U.S. national security. Based on this 
understanding, the United States can develop the basis of the U.S. domestic 
counter radicalization strategy. 
The U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy must be guided by 
principles that are consistent with U.S. domestic policy. The principles selected 
must be of a domestic nature and applicable to the proposed method that will 
carry it out. They must also be understood at a local level. 
The following principles are proposed to frame the U.S. domestic counter-
radicalization strategy: 
 xii 
• The U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy should be an 
equal, if not, greater part of the overall U.S. counterterrorism 
strategy, with the number one aim to stop U.S. citizens from 
becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.  
• The U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy should address 
the threat of radicalization from environmental groups to 
international groups.  
• The U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy effort will require 
the balancing of privacy rights, civil liberties, and civil rights versus 
countering the terrorist messaging that seeks to radicalize 
individuals.  
• The U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy will depend on a 
successful integration strategy.  
• The U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy will be built on a 
commitment to localism, where communities and local authorities 
will have a key part in this strategy.  
• The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will fund the U.S. 
domestic counter radicalization strategy.  
• The U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy must be aligned 
with domestic priorities and avoid being involved in overseas 
counterterrorism efforts.  
The U.S. counter radicalization strategy should address objectives that, 
• Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat the 
United States faces from those who promote it; 
• Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure they 
are given appropriate advice and support; and 
• Work with sectors and institutions that are familiar with the risks of 
radicalization that need to be addressed. 
In order for the U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy to be 
successful, it must be placed within the DHS to ensure effective coordination, 
oversight, and accountability. Using a well-thought-out and well-monitored grants 
program, the DHS would support those local communities who wish to address 
counter radicalization in their communities. 
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One of the critical criteria of the funding would be that while the role of 
policing is critical to the U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy, it must not 
become a police program. Funding, therefore, can be divided between two key 
areas: local authority work in association with communities, and policing. 
Through the grant program, local communities must be able to implement local 
initiatives to manage local radicalization.  
The U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy must develop, maintain, 
and utilize performance measures. Essentially, the strategy must develop an 
endgame to what the strategy is to achieve and by what means it will accomplish 
its objectives and goals. This will require an examination of other similar 
domestic social programs as well as those outside of the United States. Once 
established, the performance standards can be included as a condition of their 
counter radicalization grants program.  
The United States must implement support systems to those key priority 
areas of education, health, economics, criminal justice, faith, charities, and the 
Internet that all play a role in the cure of U.S. domestic radicalization. Support of 
these key sectors would be those federal agencies, such as the Department of 
Education, the Department of Health & Human Services, the Department of 
Labor, and the Department of Justice. Leading the strategy would be the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications (CSCC) to coordinate counter messaging that can be modified 
for local communities.  
However, since the U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy involves 
efforts from a variety of different departments, the appointment of a Counter-
Radicalization Czar in the DHS would be appropriate. The CR Czar would have 
the authority to cross departmental jurisdictions and mandate cooperation and 
support from these departments in support of U.S. counter-radicalization efforts. 
To avoid accusations that the strategy is a masquerade to spy on vulnerable 
groups, the czar must not be connected with law enforcement. The czar should 
 xiv 
have a varied professional background in government and/or business, and 
possibly be a member of one of the vulnerable groups.  
The United States has not truly developed and/or implemented a counter-
radicalization plan to handle a new kind of domestic enemy. This is an enemy 
that may not be seen until it is far too late. However, all the signs of radicalism 
may have been obvious in retrospect, becoming sympathetic to terrorist ideology 
over a period of time, the radicalized U.S. citizen. Therefore, the United States 
needs to develop a counter radicalization strategy similar to the one developed 
by the United Kingdom that is implementable at the local level, supported at the 
federal level and targets those groups that terrorists seek to persuade to join and 
support their cause. 
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I say to you: that we are in a battle, and more than half of this battle 
is in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle 
in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma. And that however 
far our capabilities reach, they will never be equal to one 
thousandth of the capabilities of the kingdom of Satan that is 
waging war on us.1 
–Letter from Ayman al-Zawahari (then 2nd in command of al-
Qa’ida) to Abu Musab al Zarqawi (then in command of al-Qa’ida in 
Iraq) in 2005 
Warfare in the 21st century has matured to the point where military 
technology and force are no longer the keys to victory. Parties in conflict during 
the twentieth century had begun to realize that success in war meant winning the 
“hearts and minds” of the people and, to an extent, the enemy forces. Today’s 
warfare has become a war of ideas. The results of this have led to an increasing 
awareness of the value and utility of media and marketing efforts in the terrorism 
and homeland security-related war of ideas and the role of the Internet to help 
transmit those ideas. However, al-Qa’ida has taken the lead in the use of the 
media and Internet to help justify its cause, solicit support, and radicalize others 
to help mobilize and carry out its mission against the United States (U.S.). Al-
Qa’ida proved to be insightful in effectively segmenting the world into 
international and domestic audiences, knowing that messages must be pertinent 
to people in those respective environments, and then utilizing a variety of media 
to convince these segmented audiences of their legitimacy and to justify the 
actions they have taken.  
The role of “soft power” is critical at this stage in the war on terror since al-
Qa’ida has not been completely defeated or eradicated. They had proven to be a 
different and unique enemy to the U.S. military. According to Hoffman, “al-Qa’ida 
has declared a war of ideas against the United States and we must engage in the 
1 Seth Jones, “How Al’Qaida Ends: Lessons Since 9/11” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Shepherdstown, WV, July 11, 2012). 
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same battlefield. Refusing to engage in the war of ideas is akin to surrendering 
this central element of the struggle.”2 
Faced with this unique type of threat, the United States lacks a coherent 
domestic counter-radicalization strategy to fight this new type of warfare. In order 
to neutralize it, the United States must develop a counter-messaging strategy to 
“reinforce, integrate, and complement public communication efforts that focuses 
on countering the rhetoric of al-Qa’ida, its affiliates and adherents, other 
international terrorist organizations and violent extremists overseas. The United 
States must then confront the al-Qa’ida rhetoric by providing tools, techniques, 
and methods for all U.S. government communicators, both domestic and 
international to advance the U.S. message.”3 However, U.S. messaging efforts 
are challenged by the variety of al-Qa’ida’s rhetoric. Their rhetoric often involves 
the seven major “sources of tension that ranges from violent extremism, the 
situation between the Israelis, Palestinians, and the Arab world, the rights and 
responsibilities of nations on nuclear weapons, democracy, religious freedom, 
women’s rights and economic opportunity.”4 
Thus, the problem statement involves communication efforts: how can the 
United States effectively fight the “war of ideas,” and can it develop its own 
counter-strategic strategy in order to address al-Qa’ida’s rhetoric? A possible 
solution would be for the United States to engage in counter radicalization 
through creating counter-terrorist messaging and providing programs that target 
those individuals who may be susceptible to the terrorist message. To begin, the 
United States would benefit from examining a current national counter-
radicalization strategy that has proven to be successful and to utilize that strategy 
and techniques within its own. One such national strategy that has been 
successful is the United Kingdom’s (UK) counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST), 
2 Robert B. Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
3“Organization Description,” January 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/cscc/. 
4 U.S. President Barack Obama, “Prepared Remarks to the Muslim World” (speech, Cairo, 
June 4, 2009). 
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specifically the PREVENT element. “The PREVENT element strategy seeks to 
actively counter the rhetoric that seeks to influence individuals in the United 
Kingdom from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.”5This thesis will study 
the PREVENT element in detail and determine if some aspects of it are 
applicable to the U.S. counterterrorism efforts.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
 “Changing language changes minds” 
–A Report for the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office6 
What aspects of the UK’s PREVENT strategy can the United States utilize 
to develop its own counter-radicalization strategy? 
B. ARGUMENT 
“Propaganda grants authority to its makers.”7 
–1991 RAND Study 
While it is obvious that the United States has deployed its “hard power” 
tactics since 2001 by committing military resources in the War on Terror, it has 
woefully failed in providing the “soft power” tactics needed to win the hearts and 
minds of the people. This was verified in 2006, when then Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld said,  
If I were grading I would say we probably deserve a ‘D’ or a ‘D-plus’ 
as a country as to how well we’re doing in the battle of ideas that’s 
taking place in the world today.8 
5 UK Home Office, Protecting the UK Against Terrorism (London: UK Home Office, 2012), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/protecting-the-uk-against-terrorism. 
6 Jim Armstrong, Candace J. Chin, and Uri Leventer, The Language of Counter-Terrorism: 
When Message Received Is Not Message Intended (Cambridge, MA: Report for Harvard 
Kennedy School of Government, 2008), 1–85, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/ 
18459/language_of_counterterrorism.html. 
7 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 198. 
8Ibid., 23. 
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As stated earlier, the role of soft power is critical at this stage in the War 
on Terror since al-Qa’ida has not been completely destroyed. Their efforts have 
established and proven them to be a different and unique enemy to the U.S. 
military. Their uniqueness at that time was exceptional and was best described 
by Bobbitt in 2007 when he stated that, 
al-Qaeda today is a sophisticated operation— with a sophisticated 
propaganda machine based in Pakistan, a secondary but 
independent base in Iraq, and an expanding reach in Europe. Its 
leadership is intact. Its decentralized command control structure 
has allowed it to survive the loss of key operatives, such as 
Zarqawi. Its Taliban allies are making a comeback in Afghanistan, 
and it is certain to get a big boost there if NATO pulls out. It will also 
claim victory when U.S. forces start withdrawing from Iraq.9 
Fast forward to 2013, and Bobbitt’s statement has proven to be true. Even 
after the U.S. withdrawal of troops from the Middle East and the death of Osama 
bin Laden, al-Qa’ida is still operational and spreading to other parts of the world. 
Its message is still to attack America and its interests. Radicalization remains a 
threat, as evidenced most recently by the April 15, 2013, Boston bombings and 
the May 22, 2013, broad daylight and public killing of Fusilier Lee Rigby outside 
the Royal Artillery Barracks in Woolwich, UK. 
The challenge, therefore, requires that the United States identify, develop, 
and aggressively utilize something more than military might on a completely 
different battlefield. This would require greater collaboration among the different 
U.S. government agencies. Hoffman aptly describes the dilemma that the United 
States finds itself in at this time. He maintains that, 
while the United States has been “tactically successful in killing or 
capturing key al-Qaeda leaders, their key lieutenants and many of 
their foot soldiers, it has been less successful in strategically 
countering al-Qaeda’s ideological appeal, its ability to radicalize 
9 Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century (New York: 
Random House, 2008), 15. 
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sympathizers, and its continued capacity to energize supporters 
and attract recruits and money and thereby sustain its struggle.10 
Therefore, the United States must turn to a greater power in this struggle 
with al-Qa’ida: the power of language.11“The rationale for this is that people in 
modern times process the events in their lives through language–verbally and via 
text, email, and social media. People process their understanding of ideas 
through language in many ways. People base their decision of whether to fight 
and die for these ideas through language. Therefore, the power rests in how 
speakers control the context of their messages. The context (or framing) impacts 
how listeners interpret what speakers are saying and shapes listeners’ 
opinions.”12“Framing is what influences peoples’ perceptions of events abroad, 
because they help the public process the myriad of events taking place in the 
vast foreign policy arena.”13 Former General Petraeus narrowed this point in his 
counterinsurgency campaign where one of its core principles was to “Fight the 
Information war relentlessly.” When in command of Afghanistan, he implored his 
military audience to, 
realize that we are in a struggle for legitimacy that will be won or 
lost in the perception of the Iraqi people. Every action taken by the 
enemy and our forces has implications in the public arena. Develop 
and sustain a narrative that works and continually drive the themes 
home through all forms of media.14 
In essence, the United States and al-Qa’ida are fighting for the hearts and 
minds of those listeners exposed to the rhetoric provided by both. The targeted 
audience is that portion of the American population that identifies with al-Qa’ida 
and has proven to be susceptible to their message. Looking in the American 
10 Bruce Hoffman, “A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration,” Terrorism 
and Political Violence 21 (2009): 360. 
11 Armstrong, Chin, and Leventer, The Language of Counter-Terrorism: When Message 
Received is Not Message Intended,1–85. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14Hoffman, “A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration,” 368. 
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communities, it could be those who feel disenfranchised from society (loners), 
the mentally ill, or Muslims who truly believe violence is the way to advance the 
Islamic religion. The Muslim community at large can be divided between 
domestic (in the United States) and international. The targets in this community 
are the domestic and international Muslim community, specifically from those 
born and reared into the Muslim community and those who may seek to become 
Muslims and come from other countries, religions, or walks of life. Regardless of 
the origin, the United States and al-Qa’ida are seeking that sliver of the 
community that could be prone to commit terrorist acts from the messages to 
which they are exposed, whether true or contrived. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
“Too easily, words of war become acts of war.”15 
–Game of Thrones, “The Kingsroad” 
“Winning the Hearts and Minds” 
–The Role of Propaganda in Conflicts 
One common theme in all of world history that is hardly ever examined is 
how easily people can be led through words (i.e., propaganda). This powerful 
subject has many other names, such as “spin, spin doctoring, brainwashing, 
mind control, indoctrination, belief manipulation, impression management, 
information control, mass persuasion, the engineering of consent, manufacturing 
consent, compliance-gaining strategies, agitprop, media bias, ideology, 
campaign rhetoric, political advertising, advocacy advertising, public relations, 
news management, corporate image advertising”16 Regardless of what word is 
used to describe propaganda, “its effective use has made people fall for 
conquerors, applaud genocide, uphold persecution, and condone exploitation. 
15 Game of Thrones, Episode 2 (“The Kingsroad”), first broadcast April 17, 2011 on HBO 
Cable Network, directed by Timothy Van Patten and written by David Benioff and D. B. Weiss. 
16 Stanley B. Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda: A Reconstruction (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publishers, 2002), 1. 
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Religions have taken it further and made people worship false deities, fear 
strange hells, bless human sacrifice and torture, admire self-mortification, and 
obey the oddest of moral codes.”17 
The study of the role of propaganda in historical conflicts can be in and of 
itself a separate study given its prolific use, whether intentional or not. For the 
purposes of this research, the literature review will frame a narrow focus of 
propaganda, rather than cover its use in history or the business, marketing, and 
public relations field as it is commonly utilized, or cover propaganda’s use by 
U.S. agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the 
Department of State (DOD), State Department, all four military branches, and 
state and local governments and agencies. The researcher’s primary reason for 
this approach is because “propaganda is dispersed among many disciplines and 
lacks a basic body of literature, a shared set of techniques, rules for evaluating 
its quality, and a channel of communication between scholars doing such 
research.”18Therefore, this review will look at sources that describe 
propaganda’s military use from World War I to its present use by terrorist groups 
and counter efforts of terrorist propaganda by the United States and the United 
Kingdom. The rationale for this is based on propaganda’s deliberate and 
successful use as an effective means of winning support from both sides: 
domestic and international. Propaganda is widely and simply used because, “it 
exploits information; it poses as knowledge; it generates belief systems and 
tenacious convictions; it skews perceptions; it systematically disregards superior 
epistemic values, such as truth and understanding; it corrupts reasoning and the 
respect for evidence, rigor and procedural safeguards.”19 
For research purposes, “winning the hearts and minds” will refer to a 
concept in conflicts where “one side seeks to persuade the population to support 
17 Oliver Thomas,Easily Led: A History of Propaganda (United Kingdom, Sutton Publishing, 
1999), preface. 
18 Brett Silverstein, “Toward a Science of Propaganda,” Political Psychology, 8, no. 1 (March 
1987): 49. 
19 Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda: A Reconstruction, 4. 
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the government and reject the insurgents, emotionally and intellectually.” The 
reference was first used in the Malayan Emergency involving Britain (1948–
1960).20 Edward Bernays, the author of the book Propaganda, was one of the 
earliest U.S. writers on the subject. Bernays stated that propaganda was not 
active in use until World War I when “governments systematically deployed the 
entire range of modern media to rouse their populations to fanatical 
assent.”21Bernays expounded further on who the propagandists were. He wrote 
the following:  
We are governed, our minds molded, our tastes formed, our ideas 
suggested, largely by men we have never heard of.” These 
“invisible governors” are a heroic [sic] elite, who coolly keep it all 
together, thereby “organizing chaos,” as God did in the Beginning. 
“It is they who pull the wires which control the public mind, who 
harness old social forces and contrive new ways to bind and guide 
the world.22 
Obviously, Bernays did not consider the use of propaganda to support 
terrorist ideology nor that propaganda’s use was not limited to just these 
“invisible Governors.” Or, maybe Osama bin Laden read Bernays’ work and 
believed al-Qa’ida to be the “invisible Governors.” Regardless, Bernays’ writing 
did reflect the original purpose of the United States Office of War Information 
under George Creel during World War I. The significance of this organization was 
that it symbolized the U.S.’s first official use of propaganda to generate U.S. 
enthusiasm for a war effort.  
Another significant writing on propaganda’s military use is the history of 
The United States Information Agency written by William Chodkowski in 2012. 
His work describes the full-scale U.S. governmental support of the use of 
propaganda in conflict under the United States Information Agency (USIA) during 
20 William E. Rieper, Irregular Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations: Their Roles and 
Considerations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Studies, United States Army 
Command and General Staff College, 2010), 14. 
21 Edward Bernays, Propaganda (New York: Ig Publishing, 1928), 11. 
22Ibid., 17. 
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the Cold War. “At the height of the Cold War, the USIA presided over U.S. 
information to over 150 populations internationally and had an annual budget of 
$1 billion in the years directly after the fall of the Berlin Wall.”23“The USIA was 
created in 1953 under President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Its origin can be traced 
back to Congress’s acknowledgement of the federal government’s need to 
communicate with foreign populations, continuing the wartime exchange of 
information into a permanent, peacetime practice.”24 Its official mission was “to 
understand, inform and influence foreign policies in promotion of the national 
interest, and to broaden the dialogue between Americans and the U.S. 
institutions and their counterparts abroad.”25“It carried its mission through four 
distinct functions: (1) explain and advocate U.S. policies in terms that are 
credible and meaningful in foreign cultures; (2) provide information about the 
official policies of the United States and about the people, values, and institutions 
which influence those policies; (3) bring the benefits of international engagement 
to American citizens and institutions by helping them build strong long-term 
relationships with their counterparts overseas; and (4) advise the President and 
U.S. government policymakers on the ways in which foreign attitudes will have a 
direct bearing on the effectiveness of U.S. policies.”26 
The USIA had its roots in World War II, a declared war. “Subsequently the 
USIA was active during the Cold War, acting as if the United States was “at war” 
with the USSR and was quite successful in making many believe that the United 
States was at war. The USIA was abolished effective 1999 under the passage of 
the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act that divided the USIA’s duties 
between the Under Secretary for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy within the 
State Department (information and exchange functions) and the Broadcasting 
23 William M. Chodkowski, American Security Project Fact Sheet (Washington, DC: The 





                                            
Board of Governors (broadcasting function).”27 Even though the USIA was 
abolished, the role of propaganda was maintained, and USIA’s mission is 
currently in effect through the two previously mentioned organizations, and is still 
fully federally funded today.  
Another critical piece describing the USIA’s eventual demise is Cull’s 
book, The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency. With its 
motto of “Telling America’s Story to the World,” the USIA was the core agency of 
public diplomacy.28“Its strength was the United States Information Service 
(USIS), a global network of posts that collected and disseminated information 
vital to the capital and corps of ambassadors. The USIS also was staffed with a 
large and experienced staff armed with an array of resources at its disposal.”29 
The following are a range of offices they produced:  
The short wave radio station Voice of America (VOA), wartime 
cultural centers and libraries, documentary and television film units, 
Marshall Plan information offices, the Amerika Hauser created from 
the reeducation of Germany, embassy press specialists, 
magazines, speakers, and exhibition programs.30 
While the USIA conducted its mission successfully, it never was made part 
of assisting in the making of U.S. foreign policy. In fact, Ed Murrow, the 
prominent journalist who was the USIA director, was not part of Kennedy’s Bay of 
Pigs invasion in 1961, yet part of its failure may have been unfairly placed on the 
USIA. Unfortunately, the USIA, like any federal agency, was subject to the typical 
justification of its budget and was part of the “spoils of the winning administration” 
in placing of cronies. Be that as it may, the USIA functioned quite effectively by 
expanding its resources and efforts throughout the world. However, having sold 
27Chodkowski, American Security Project Fact Sheet, 6. 
28 Nicholas J. Cull, The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency: American 




                                            
itself as a necessity of the Cold War, the end of the Cold War called its place and 
function in government into question. 
According to Dizard in Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. 
Information Agency, the USIA’s role was to “portray the United States through 
the prism of national strategic interests. In a phrase, the agency was a 
propaganda operation, replicating similar programs of other governments, both 
friendly and hostile.”31Dizard states that “through the USIA’s numerous posts 
(more than 300 worldwide, which were the largest of any federal agency to date), 
U.S. private interests were able to expand their presence worldwide. One such 
private interest was U.S. commercial media corporations that brought massive 
amounts of commercial media and cultured goods and services.”32 However, 
even Dizard would agree with the researcher that after 9/11, a new 
communications environment has been created through the Internet that is 
forming “a different set of global relationships that take into account the ideas 
and perceptions of ordinary human beings.”33 It is the radicalization of ordinary 
human beings into committing terrorist acts that symbolizes the recognition of the 
need for policies that can “respect the world’s many cultures with a practical 
recognition of the crosscutting influences created by the information age.”34 
Aside from the literature previously discussed and the myriad of U.S. 
strategic plans dealing with the U.S. response to terrorism, the subject of this 
research centers on the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST), specifically 
the PREVENT element of it. There have been three versions of the UK 
CONTEST: 2006, 2009, and 2011. The United Kingdom recognized the effective 
radicalization of individuals towards supporting terrorist groups and, in extreme 
cases, actually carrying out terrorist acts on behalf of those groups. “The 
31 Wilson P. Dizard Jr., Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information 





                                            
PREVENT element strategy specifically explores, discusses, and recommends 
key actions to counter the terrorist rhetoric that influences individuals in 
supporting terrorism or even becoming terrorists. However, based on the 
Coalition government taking office in 2010, an official review of the PREVENT 
strategy was conducted. The review was in response to the July 7, 2005, 
attacks.”35 Based on their research, the PREVENT strategy should continue to 
“focus on radicalization linked to the main terrorist threat facing the United 
Kingdom, from groups that are usually collectively referred to as Islamic 
fundamentalist, Al Qa’ida-related, or Islamist terrorists.”36“Yet it also must be 
flexible enough to address terrorism from Northern Ireland and right-wing terrorist 
groups and individuals.”37 
However noble their intent was, there have been criticisms of the 
PREVENT strategy that warrant a review in order to gauge its effectiveness in 
elements of it being recommended as part of the U.S. counterterrorism 
communications strategy. In the article, “The Impact of UK Anti-Terror Laws on 
Freedom of Expression” by Article 19 (an international human rights organization 
that defends and promotes freedom of expression and freedom of information 
around the world), the authors claim that the adoption of  
a vague and wide definition of ‘terrorism’ and an increase in the use 
of anti-terror laws stifles legitimate political and social protest. In 
addition, recent laws and policies outlaw not just acts of terrorism, 
or their direct incitement, but also the “indirect encouragement” or 
“other inducement” of terrorism, including its glorification.38 
In essence, CONTEST and the PREVENT phase of it seemed entirely 
targeted at the UK Muslim community and the Muslim religion, thus causing 
35 Home Affairs Committee, Roots of Violent Radicalization (London: U.K. Parliament, 2013). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38“The Impact of UK Anti-Terror Laws on Freedom of Expression,”2006, http://www.article 
19.org/data/files/pdfs/analysis/terrorism-submission-to-icj-panel.pdf. 
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further alienation. According to detractors, it resulted in Islamophobia and a 
broader view that the West was at war with Islam itself. 
In addition, two articles from the Pew Research Center also will be 
included in this research. The Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank 
that informs the public about the issues, attitudes, and trends shaping America 
and the world. Through public opinion polling, demographic research, media 
content analysis, and other empirical social science research methods, Pew 
Research provides data that can help explain what is currently happening in the 
world and assist in predicting what policies should be in place to account for 
future trends. What makes Pew Research attractive is that it does not take policy 
positions. It also should be mentioned that it is a subsidiary of The Pew 
Charitable Trusts. The two articles that will be discussed in this thesis will be The 
Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010–2030, created by 
Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life, and the Pew 
Research Global Attitudes Project that discusses Muslims’ and Christians’ 
attitudes towards each other. 
According to the 2011 Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 
majorities in the UK (64%) and the U.S. (57%) express favorable 
views of Muslims, claiming that Muslims are honest and generous. 
Yet, many attribute negative characteristics, particularly violence 
and fanaticism, to Muslims, with some stating that few Muslims are 
tolerant or respectful of women.39 
In addition, majorities in the U.S. (54%) and the UK (52%) believe 
that some religions are more prone to violence than others, and 
when asked which religion they think is the most violent, large 
majorities in each of these countries, the UK (74%) and the U.S. 
(70%), select Islam.40 
However, the U.S. and the UK are the only two countries in the 
survey where fewer than half of non-Muslims attribute each of the 
39Andrew Kohut, “Muslim-Western Tensions Persist, Pew Research Center Global Attitudes 




                                            
six negative traits (selfish, violent, greedy, immoral, arrogant, and 
fanatical) tested to Muslims, but even in these countries there still 
are many negative views.41 
For instance, when asked whether Muslims are violent, “45 percent of 
those surveyed in the U.S. said yes while 46 percent said they are not. The UK, 
when asked if Muslims are fanatical or not, is evenly divided: 43 percent said yes 
and 42 percent said no.”42 
When asked whether they associate a series of four positive traits 
(generous, honest, tolerant, and respectful to women) and six negative traits 
(selfish, violent, greedy, immoral, arrogant, and fanatical) with people in Western 
countries, nearly every Muslim surveyed (majorities of Muslims in Turkey, Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Palestinian territories) said that 
Westerners primarily are made up of those negative traits.43 The Pew Study also 
interestingly noted that “Muslims identified themselves primarily with their religion 
versus being citizens of their country,”44 as opposed to Westerners who 
identified themselves primarily with their country versus their religion. 
Finally, there will be several news articles specifically from the UK press, 
such as the Times, Daily Telegraph, and Guardian. The daily coverage they 
provide will lend to the research topic and help provide more timely information 
on current happenings on terrorism and its impact on the United Kingdom and 
the world.  
The research conducted here is similar to thesis work conducted by Kirk J. 
Sampson’s and Brad Deardorff’s at the Naval Postgraduate School Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security. Sampson’s thesis entitled, “Winning the Battle 
of Ideas Through Individual Resiliency: A Multi-Dimensional Approach for 
Countering Radicalization in the Homeland,” proposed disrupting the 





                                            
radicalization process by implementing counter-radicalization strategy into 
existing strategies. Using policy analysis methodology, he examined both U.S. 
and UK approaches for countering radicalization.45 The research proposed in 
this thesis is additive because it takes Sampson’s work and examines the UK’s 
PREVENT strategy much more in depth than he did, and makes 
recommendations that are operational versus Sampson’s broad 
recommendations. 
In Deardorff’s thesis titled “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge 
and the Opportunity” used comparative policy analysis between the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands and proposes a U.S. regional approach to counter 
radicalization through Regional Outreach and Operational Coordination Centers 
(ROOCC).46 However, the research proposed here suggests that counter-
radicalization efforts should be approached at the local level. Local jurisdictions 
would assess their own environment and decide on what strategies to use in 
countering radicalization against groups that are unique to them.  
The research discussed is necessary because it extends Sampson’s and 
Deardorff’s insightful and groundbreaking analysis to actual implementation. The 
research essentially goes from Sampson’s national strategy recommendations, 
to Deardorff’s regional strategy recommendations down to local strategy 
recommendations where the U.S. counter-radicalization strategy is actually 
discussed in an operational context. At the very least, the work conducted on all 
three theses might possibly lead to either further extended thesis research by 
future students to build upon or further examination at the different government 
levels for possible implementation. 
45 Kirk J. Sampson, “Winning the Battle of Ideas Through Individual Resiliency: A Multi-
Dimensional Approach for Countering Radicalization in the Homeland” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2009). 
46Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity.” 
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D. MEDIA AND TERRORISM 
“Without communication there can be no terrorism.”47 
–Bruce Hoffman quoting Schmid and de Graaf 
Much like a marriage, media and terrorism always have been 
interdependent; for each one needs the other to help advance its own self-
interests. In order for terrorists to make their position known to all and garner 
support, they need the media to publicize their actions. The media must report on 
terrorist actions for ratings and market share. Both are able to enhance each 
one’s needs and purposes. However, while it may be perceived that they “work” 
together to meet their own needs, the relationship can be uncertain. Neither side 
can be completely confident that what they seek from the other will satisfy their 
needs. Terrorists have to consider if the media will get their message “right” in 
order to highlight their goals and win over sympathizers/followers. Likewise, the 
media must consider if they are being given accurate information, showing 
unintended support for them, or if they themselves could become victims of these 
terrorist acts. 
UchennaEkwo with the Center for Media & Peace Initiatives indirectly 
provided a very accurate description of the relationship between the media and 
terrorism. His description of the media and the democratization of Africa could be 
applied also to terrorism. By substituting the word democratization with terrorist, 
the following apt describes their relationship: “Media and terrorism are clearly 
inseparable bedfellows. The relationship between the two is complex at worst 
and interwoven at best and can be aptly described as mutual political bedfellows 
or implacable arch-foes. It is therefore safe to say that media and terrorism are 
close cousins that can relate or deflate at different times.”48 
47Hoffman, Inside Terrorism. 




                                            
Rogan proposes, “with the development of mass media, modern terrorism 
has been portrayed as an act of communication and has been named “mass 
mediated terrorism,” indicating an existential link between terrorism and publicity 
via the mass media.”49 He describes, “terrorists now perform on the 
“informational battlefield” where they must pattern their attacks to attract the 
media so the world can hear their message.”50 However, “with the Internet and 
technological advances in video production, terrorists now have expanded the 
quality and quantity of their message”51 and thus no longer require the media at 
all. In essence, terrorism “outgrew” its relationship and need of the media and 
now has divorced itself from them. 
Al-Qa-ida’s expansion into the Internet ties in positively to the trend where 
viewers are no longer relying on TV networks to receive their news. According to 
the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press,  
the next generation of news consumers are increasingly going to 
the Internet for their daily news. Online and digital news 
consumption, meanwhile, continues to increase, with many more 
people now getting news on cell phones, tablets or other mobile 
platforms. And perhaps the most dramatic change in the news 
environment has been the rise of social networking sites. The 
percentage of Americans saying they saw news or news headlines 
on a social networking site yesterday has doubled—from 9% to 
19%—since 2010. Among adults younger than age 30, as many 
saw news on a social networking site the previous day (33%) as 
saw any television news (34%), with just 13% having read a 
newspaper either in print or digital form.52 
At this point, one can see the power of propaganda in motivating people to 
take action and how the media initially helped terrorists spread their message. 
The importance of propaganda and the mediums that help deliver the message 
49 Hanna Rogan, Al-Qaeda’s Online Media Strategies: From Abu Reuter to Irhabi 007 
(Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2007). 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 “In Changing News Landscape, Even Television is Vulnerable: Trends in News 
Consumption, 1991–2012,” 2013, http://www.people-press.org/2012/09/27/in-changing-news-
landscape-even-television-is-vulnerable/. 
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are the first steps in the process of radicalization by delivering the message for 
those people to read it, believe it, and, most importantly, take action based upon 
it. 
E. PROCESS OF RADICALIZATION 
There are a myriad of reasons that can possibly explain how a person 
becomes radicalized from political, religious, social, economic, racial, and ethnic 
points of view. Section 2.59 of the Prevent element within the 2011 CONTEST 
describes radicalization as the “process by which people come to support, and in 
some cases to participate in terrorism.”53 However, the crux of this is to ask what 
are the drivers relevant to radicalization? Even an analysis of more than 500 
terrorists failed to yield any common cause of radicalization. According to 
Deardorff, assumed factors, such as economic deprivation, brainwashing, 
religious knowledge, poor education, and sexual frustration were discounted as 
causes. In fact, “many of the terrorists studied grew up in traditional families 
where they had positive relationships with family and friends.”54 It has been 
proposed that certain stressors can trigger “cognitive openings.” This is where 
“life-changing events can cause abnormal stress to the subject and thus increase 
the subject’s vulnerability to recruitment to a group or cause.”55 Contrary to this 
position is in the case of the Tsarnaev brothers 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. 
According to Abdo, “the Tsarnaev brothers should not be considered homegrown 
terrorists because “they lived in ‘two worlds’ yet did not feel like they belonged to 
either and received their teaching and instruction from the Internet.”56 
53 HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 
Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her 
Majesty (London: HM Government, 2011).  
54 Brad Deardorff, The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism 
(Williams, CA: Agile Press, 2013). 
55Ibid., 21. 
56GeneiveAbdo, “Boston Attacks Should Not Be Labeled “Homegrown” Terrorism,”“ 
Newsday, April 23, 2013. 
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The research presented later will concentrate on how the use of 
propaganda and the media may be contributing factors to the radicalization of 
individuals, regardless of socioeconomic status (SES). The research will attempt 
to advance the argument that regardless of these viewpoints on radicalization, it 
all begins with the “message” and the environment in which it is “received.” 
The use of the media, especially the various delivery technologies (i.e., 
the Internet, television, radio, print, etc.), has been discussed as taking terrorists’ 
messages to a higher level of effectiveness in transmitting their message. That 
higher level is in the form of instantaneous messaging by terrorists to explain 
their actions in their own voice, clearer messages unedited by the media, near 
TV quality in their own video production, and even their own insurgent television 
stations. Hoffman emphasizes the importance of this effort when he states the 
following: 
What is clear, though, is that as terrorist communications continue 
to change and evolve so will the nature of terrorism itself. While one 
cannot predict what new forms and dimensions terrorism will 
assume during the rest of the twenty-first century, this evolutionary 
process will continue and will doubtless be abetted—and 
accelerated—by new communications technologies—as has been 
the case over the past decade.57 
Based on the terrorist message now being delivered in this manner, 
radicalization among potential supporters now is more efficient and cost effective. 
Terrorist organizations have harnessed the power of communication and use it to 
their advantage. They no longer are concerned about just collecting guns and 
weapons or physically planning their attack. They now are more focused on 
obtaining video cameras, laptop computers, CD burners, and a high-speed 
Internet connection. According to Hoffman, “the use of these inexpensive 
communications technologies allows foreign powers like al-Qa’ida and other 
terrorist groups to spread their message. The targeted audience is that portion of 
57Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 228. 
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the American population that identifies with al-Qa’ida and has proven susceptible 
to their message.”58 
F. UK COUNTER RESPONSE TO AL-QA-IDA’S MEDIA STRATEGY 
Even with all the effort on pursuing terrorists, the UK government realized 
that its strategy on preventing future terrorist acts was not sufficient. 
Subsequently, the Home Office became a new strategic hub for all 
counterterrorism policy: the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT).59 
The OSCT provides strategic direction to the UK’s work to counter the threat 
from terrorism. The primary objective is to protect the public from terrorism by 
working with other government organizations and deliver the UK’s counter-
terrorism strategy (CONTEST).60 As of 2014, the OSCT reports to Home 
Secretary Theresa May, who was not Home Secretary when OSCT was created, 
and the parliamentary Under Secretary for Crime and Security James 
Brokenshire. Of the OSCT’s five main responsibilities, their first is to support the 
Home Secretary and other Ministers in directing and implementing CONTEST—
the government’s strategy for countering terrorism. 
When the United Kingdom updated CONTEST it was based on the belief 
that international counterterrorism work had made significant progress over the 
previous 10 years and that al-Qa’ida was weaker than at any time since 9/11, 
having played no role in recent political change in North Africa and the Middle 
East. Its ideology had been widely discredited, and it had failed in all its 
objectives. Nonetheless, “the government still believed that al-Qa’ida continued 
to be a significant threat and other terrorist groups, some affiliated with al-Qa’ida, 
had become stronger. In addition, the threat from Northern Ireland related 
terrorism also had increased.”61 
58Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 226. 




                                            
In response, the United Kingdom updated the 2006 CONTEST in 2009 
and it reintroduced four core areas:62 
Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks. 
Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. 
Protect: to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack. 
Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack. 
Under PREVENT, the United Kingdom looks to prevent terrorism by 
challenging extremist ideas conducive to terrorism or shared by terrorist groups 
and making a clearer distinction between PREVENT work and programs to 
support integration. The strategy was again updated in 2011, and will be 
discussed later in this research. 
G. METHODOLOGIES OF STUDY 
1. Case Study and Policy Modeling 
The method used to conduct this research was the qualitative method 
known as “case study,” whereby the unit of study is the UK’s counter-terrorism 
strategy (CONTEST), specifically the PREVENT element of the strategy that 
seeks to prevent people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The 
rationale for this selection as a case study is based on an absence of other well-
developed models to examine, thus resulting in this case to be a critical case or 
outlier case. According to Yin, “case studies are pertinent when the research 
addresses either a descriptive question—’What is happening or has 
happened?’—or an explanatory question—’How or why did something 
happen?’”63 For the purposes of this research, it seeks to understand how the 
PREVENT element of the UK’s CONTEST functions and if it can be utilized in the 
U.S. counterterrorism strategy. 
62 UK Home Office, Protecting the UK Against Terrorism. 
63 Robert K. Yin, Applications of Case Study Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 2012), 5. 
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The design of a case study incorporates three steps: defining the case, 
selecting the case design, and using theory in design work. For the purposes of 
this research, the defined case will be the PREVENT element of the UK 
CONTEST from its inception to its current status. The case design therefore will 
be an embedded, single case study since it will only involve the PREVENT 
element. As far as using theory in this type of design work, the research 
conducted here will exclusively examine PREVENT, and therefore, not 
incorporate or use any theory.  
In terms of case study analysis, since the research question is open-
ended and it has not yet been determined if the PREVENT element started with 
any predicted pattern, the explanation-building technique was utilized. Another 
case study analytic technique that was used is the time-series analyses. It 
involved developing a chronology of key events that may hint at possible causal 
relationships. 
The case study method “is very suitable for learning about a little known or 
poorly understood situation,”64 which this research seeks to do in examining the 
UK’s counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST), specifically the PREVENT element 
of the strategy that seeks to preclude people becoming radicalized into becoming 
terrorists or supporting terrorism. The research conducted asserts that the UK’s 
situation is not completely understood by U.S. counterterrorism strategists as a 
viable option to aid U.S. military/law enforcement forces and interests in 
implementing counter radicalization as part of its overall counterterrorism 
strategy.  
“The major weakness of the single case study is that it cannot be made 
certain that the research findings are generalizable to other situations.”65 George 
Bernard Shaw (1856–1950) once said, “England and America are two countries 
separated by a common language.” The statement could resonate with some 
64 Paul D. Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Ormrod, Practical Research: Planning & Design, 8th ed. 
(Columbus, OH: Pearson, 2005), 135. 
65Ibid., 35. 
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accuracy since the basis of this research will examine how the United Kingdom 
uses language and programs to counter radicalize those people prone to be 
sympathetic to terrorism. Does the phrasing and “wordsmithing” used by the UK’s 
PREVENT phase have any bearing on its successful transferability to the U.S. 
counter-radicalization efforts? 
At the end of the case study research, the researcher provides analytic 
generalizations that lead to a set of recommendations for the United States 
counterterrorism communications strategic plan. Per Yin, “analytic 
generalizations depend on using a study’s theoretical framework to establish 
logic that might be applicable to other situations.”66 In this research, the other 
situation would be the U.S. position on counter-radicalization. 
The method to outline a proposal of a U.S. counter-radicalization strategy 
based on local organizations is policy modeling. “Policy modeling, a type of policy 
analysis and evaluation, is broader than management science (using a system 
approach to implement actions) and operations research (focusing on problem 
solving) in that it 1) has interdisciplinary focuses of physical, economic, social, 
and political systems; 2) employs broader range of techniques; 3) focuses on 
formulation of models and solutions rather than technical details and 
computation.”67 The proposed U.S. counter radicalization strategy is 
interdisciplinary in that it relies on a variety of U.S. government systems. It will 
also employ a range of techniques from a sociological and individual 
psychological perspective. Finally, rather than employing technical aspects, 
much of the effort will look at counter radicalization from an existing state and a 
desired state of where local organizations want their community to be in handling 
counter-radicalization. 
By utilizing these two methodologies, the study of the UK PREVENT 
strategy involved looking at its individual components. Then the process of its 
66Leedy and Ormrod, Practical Research: Planning & Design, 18. 
67 Hun Myoung Park, “Introduction to Policy Modeling” (syllabus, International University of 
Japan, Winter 2014). 
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development was examined per the original 2006 version and why certain 
sections of it were changed resulting in the 2011 version. Finally, an analysis of 
its impact/success was examined to see if it the United Kingdom had reached the 
desired state they sought. 
2. Conclusion 
When it comes to waging a traditional military campaign against a country, 
the United States has no equal in the amount of manpower, technology, wealth 
and equipment that it will use. Given the warfare history of the United States, it 
also has the experience and strategies necessary to wage battle. However, the 
United States is now facing a different type of adversary. It is an adversary that is 
not in another country, is easily recognizable or may even realize that they are 
the enemy. It is the U.S. citizen that becomes radicalized to carry out terrorist 
actions against the United States. This individual, through a variety of 
environmental conditions and through the terrorist messaging via the Internet, 
has heard a message that resonates within him/her that death and destruction 
are necessary to carry out the group’s goals. 
The research conducted explores how the United States can mount a 
strategy against this type of terrorist by examining counter-radicalization efforts of 
a country also tasked with this same issue, the UK’s PREVENT Strategy. By 
examining the components of the UK strategy, insight can be gained into 
exploring how aspects of it may be transferable into a U.S. counter-radicalization 
strategy. Unlike previous research that touts a national and regional strategy, the 
research proposed here looks at how counter-radicalization can be carried out at 
the local level with regional and national agencies only providing support.  
H. OVERVIEW OF UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
To explore this subject, the following topics will be covered in the 
subsequent chapters.  
• Chapter II, will provide a broad overview of the UK’s first 
PREVENT 2006 strategy, the processes and factors of 
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radicalization, and how the United Kingdom attempted to address 
these processes and factors. 
• Chapter III will examine how PREVENT 2006 strategy was 
modified to develop into PREVENT 2011 by examining the 
shortcomings of PREVENT 2006, such as its narrow focus on the 
Muslim community, accusations of spying, misallocation of funds, 
lack of an effective integration strategy, and addressing 
radicalization overseas, especially in North and West Africa. The 
research will also propose that the development of PREVENT 2011 
also stemmed from the realization that the United Kingdom was 
involved in an “irregular warfare” situation and needed to adjust its 
strategy accordingly. 
• Chapter IV will analyze why the current U.S. National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism (USCS) does not provide the counter-
radicalization measures required in today’s new domestic 
battlefield. It will accomplish this effort by first discussing 
radicalization and establishing that through all the known causes of 
radicalization, it all begins with a message that the United States 
has failed to respond to. The analysis will specifically discuss the 
four guiding principles and the areas of focus of the USCS strategy 
and how they each fall short of what each seeks to accomplish.  
• Chapter V will provide an examination of the factors that must be 
considered for the development of a U.S. domestic counter-
radicalization program. The chapter will propose and examine the 
goals and objectives of the strategy as well as the means to carry it 
out from a U.S. government perspective. It will explore partnerships 
that should be considered to enhance federal engagement with 
local communities, build local government and local law 
enforcement expertise, and promote American ideals as a counter 
to al-Qa’ida ideology.  
I. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
“Time will bring forth new and more lethal terrorist groups long after 
al Qaeda is defeated.” 
–Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent  
Literature: No unified counter-radicalization strategy currently exists to aid 
in counterterrorism. This research will make U.S. counter-radicalization strategy 
recommendations. The effort is significant because if the terrorist message is not 
countered, it will lead to further radicalization both abroad and domestically. 
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Since there is not a currently implemented streamlined messaging system in the 
United States, the literature is not available to analyze its effectiveness. The goal 
of this research is to contribute such information to the field. 
Immediate consumer/customer: Every stakeholder in homeland security 
effort with a public face should be able to learn from and use this research, i.e., 
State Department, DOD, DHS, FBI, the State Department’s Bureau of Public 
Policy and Public Affairs, and the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications are immediate consumers. This research will identify a “soft 
power” technique that will attack the enemy head on and at the roots of their 
support. 
Homeland security practitioners and national leaders: This research will 
present a new approach to help further the development of local and regional 
strategies to counter domestic radicalization.  
Future research efforts: This thesis will assist future research efforts of 
others pursuing the development of a national counter-radicalization and/or a 
counterterrorism strategic communications strategy by providing a starting point 
upon which to build. The research conducted will advance an approach that will 
impact the enemy militarily, but in a non-military manner. The ultimate goal is to 
maximize control over messaging to the masses without jeopardizing any single 
agency’s efforts to carry out necessary anti-terrorist action to protect the United 
States. 
J. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The research of this study is limited to only open source documents; that 
is, no interviews, no access to archival data, no direct observations, no 
participant observation, and no examination of physical artifacts were utilized. 
Regardless, the topic and discussion undertaken will provide a springboard for 




Some may believe that with the withdrawal of troops from Iran and 
Afghanistan and the death of Osama bin Laden, the War on Terror is over. 
However, on July 25, 2012, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Director 
Mathew Olsen testified before the House Committee on Homeland Security that 
“the overall terrorist threat remains persistent, adaptive and resilient.”68“These 
groups are multidimensional and are blurring the lines between terrorist group, 
insurgency, and criminal gang.”69 The method of their growth is through their use 
of the media. He supports this by citing “how al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) are 
supporting global extremism in their media statements and their publishing of an 
explosives training video calling for lone wolf attacks against the West, and even 
with the deaths of Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, the Inspire magazine still 
endures and continues to reach a global audience of violent extremists.”70“The 
United States must realize that its campaign against terrorism did not end with 
the death of Osama bin Laden, and more than a decade after 9/11 it remains at 
war with al-Qa’ida.”71 
The United Kingdom has had a longer and more significant history with 
terrorist attacks, both domestic (IRA) and international (London subway 
bombings July 7, 2005), than the United States. As a major country, they provide 
a variety of rich targets that are susceptible to attacks, such as government 
facilities, transportation systems, critical infrastructures, and international events, 
such as the recent London Summer Olympics that took place during the summer 
of 2012. The United States has similar targets and, like the United Kingdom, 
supports a wide variety of international travel through air and sea, thus providing 
a wealth of targets to international terrorists. One key difference between the two 






                                            
countries is that the United Kingdom has purposely made counter-radicalization 
strategy a significant part of its counterterrorism plan to offset the impact of the 
terrorist message and its intended audiences. 
Based on these facts, the purpose of this thesis will establish the rationale 
for the United States to develop a counter-radicalization strategy on the War on 
Terror and the means for implementation through an examination of the UK 
PREVENT model. The following chapter will examine the UK’s 2006 PREVENT. 
How it was implemented and the challenges it faced that warranted it to be 
reevaluated and subsequently modified. 
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II. UNITED KINGDOM’S PREVENT 2006 STRATEGY 
“As the threat continues to evolve, our efforts to protect against 
those threats must evolve as well.” 
–National Strategy for Counterterrorism72 
A. CONTEST 
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the United Kingdom. Based on the 
long-running troubles in Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom has a rich 
experience in repeated domestic terrorist attacks, which had become the basis of 
its counterterrorism strategy. Since 2003, the United Kingdom has had a long-
term strategy for countering international terrorism known within the government 
as CONTEST. The aim of CONTEST is “to reduce the risk from international 
terrorism in order for people to go about their daily lives freely and with 
confidence.”73 The CONTEST strategy is divided into four principal strands:  
• PREVENT terrorism by tackling the radicalization of individuals 
• PURSUE terrorists and those that sponsor them 
• PROTECT the public, key national services, and UK interests 
abroad 
• PREPARE74 for the consequences 
However, in 2006 the United Kingdom believed they faced a continuing 
threat from extremists who believed they could advance their aims by committing 
acts of terrorism in the United Kingdom against its citizens and its interests 
abroad. The principal terrorist threats at that time were made by “radicalized 
individuals who used a distorted and unrepresentative version of the Islamic faith 
72Deardorff, The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism, 1. 
73 HM Government, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for 




                                            
to justify their violence.”75  “These ideologues espoused a violent ideology for 
militant Islamists that believes in a selective interpretation of the Quran, opposes 
the beliefs of non-Muslims, and rejects political participation in both Western 
democracies and Middle Eastern institutions of government.”76 Though the 
United Kingdom believed this group to only be a small minority within the Muslim 
community, much of the UK’s antiterrorism focus was nonetheless on the Muslim 
community.  
B. PREVENT 2006 
Despite the efforts of the aforementioned operations in neutralizing some 
of the main supporters of Muslim radical ideology, these ideas still exist. Due to 
the ubiquity of these ideas and their acceptance by some in the Muslim 
community, other nations, such as the Netherlands have sought to take a more 
comprehensive and nonviolent approach to tackling violent extremism. 
Authorities label these programs as countering violent extremism (CVE), and 
they exist in both Muslim and non-Muslim majority states.77 According to 
Deardorff, “bin Laden’s demise offers our nation an opportunity to truly prevent 
terrorism for the next generation. It is time to unplug the machine to transition 
from a preemptive to a preventative strategy.”78 
The PREVENT strand of the 2006 CONTEST sought to prevent terrorism 
by tackling the radicalization of individuals. It sought to do this by 
• “tackling the disadvantaged and supporting reform by addressing
structural problems within the UK and abroad that could potentially
contribute to radicalization, such as inequalities and discrimination;”
• “deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage
others to become terrorists by changing the environment in which
75 HM Government, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for 
Countering International Terrorism Annual Report, 12. 
76 William Sheridan Combs, “Assessing Two Countering Violent Extremism Programs: Saudi 
Arabia’s PRAC and the United Kingdom’s Prevent Strategy,” Small Wars Journal (July 2013). 
77 Ibid. 
78Deardorff, The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism, xiv. 
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the extremists and those who perform radicalization can operate;” 
and 
• “engage in the battle of ideas via challenging the ideologies that
extremists believe can justify the use of violence, primarily by
helping Muslims who wish to dispute these ideas to do so.”79
Finally, Deardorff stated, “the concept of a continuously evolving threat 
frames the fundamental challenge of developing a national counterterrorism 
doctrine. When the threat is dynamic, ideological and impacts a diverse 
population, lines of delineation between ‘us’ and ‘them’, free speech and violent 
rhetoric, and positive messaging and propaganda can become substantially 
blurred. These terms are understood differently depending on an individual’s 
personal experience and the cultural context in which one lives. Essentially, the 
terms are all subjective.”80 
The researcher believes it was this subjectivity that may not have been 
completely appreciated and understood by the different levels of government and 
all the interested parties involved. Though the United Kingdom had been dealing 
with terrorism for decades, the terrorist created after 9/11 involves a completely 
different type of terrorist. Today’s terrorist has both a domestic and international 
influence that provides them the rationale to be radicalized. Today’s terrorist can 
learn everything they need to be effective from the Internet at their leisure. And, 
finally, today’s terrorist may be those individuals who have grown up in the very 
community they seek to destroy.  
C. PROCESSES OF RADICALIZATION 
In order for PREVENT 2006 to be effective, it examined the processes by 
which individuals become radicalized. It stated, “to understand how terrorist 
groups recruit new members and sustain support for their activities, it is critical to 
understand the processes whereby certain experiences and events in a person’s 
79 HM Government, Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy 
(London, HM Government, 2006), 1-2. 
80Deardorff, The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism, xv. 
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life cause them to become radicalized, to the extent of turning to violence to 
resolve perceived grievances.”81 At the time, the United Kingdom believed there 
were a range of potential factors in radicalization with no one factor being more 
dominant than the others.82 The radicalizing factors were as follows: 
• “development of sense of grievance and injustice where the
terrorists’ version of history and recent events is highly negative
and partial in its interpretation of past interactions between Islam
and the West;”83
• “the process of globalization where traditional structures are
challenged along the political, social, and cultural spectrum;”84
• “anti-Westernism where the presence of Western military forces
conveys a paternalistic and condescending atmosphere that
“emasculates” older and younger natives by conveying to their
fellow countrymen that they are unable to run their own country;
• specific events, such as Coalition action to restore sovereignty in
Kuwait was depicted as attacks upon Islam itself;”85
• “a sense of personal alienation or community disadvantage arising
from socioeconomic factors, such as discrimination, social
exclusion, and lack of opportunity;”86 and finally,
• “exposure to ideas that can be from radical literature, the Internet,
or more likely the association from local contacts and peers.”87
While none of these factors is conclusive, the research undertaken here 
believes that it is the exposure to ideas that is the one commonality amongst all 
radicalization processes and is the one certainty amongst the subjectivity 
mentioned earlier. 








At the time, PREVENT 2006 saw the radicalization process as a two-stage 
process. It was assumed that an alienated individual who has become highly 
radicalized is not necessarily a terrorist. “Only a tiny minority of radicalized 
individuals actually crosses over to become terrorists: by financing, lending 
facilities to, or encouraging active terrorists, or by actively participating in terrorist 
attacks.”88 In the event that an individual becomes a terrorist, “a range of factors 
could be involved with no single predominant factor or exclusivity to Islam in the 
West. It is likely the catalyst for any given individual becoming a terrorist will be a 
combination of different factors unique to that person.”89“Two such factors are a 
sense of grievance and injustice. Both can arise from a terrorist’s perception or 
version of history, and recent events can have a highly negative impact along 
with his or her interpretation of past interactions between Islam and the West. 
Another potential factor is a sense of personal alienation or community 
disadvantage, arising from socioeconomic factors, such as discrimination, social 
exclusion, and lack of opportunity. While an individual may not be relatively 
disadvantaged, he or she may identify with others seen as less privileged; also, 
different generations within the same family may have significantly different views 
about these issues.”90 
The final factor is exposure to radical ideas. “Sources of these ideas may 
come from reading persuasive literature or surfing the Internet; however, 
exposure will primarily come from local contacts and from peers. Exposure to a 
forceful and inspiring figure already committed to extremism can be an important 
influence and, thus, a critical factor in radicalization. The influential person may 
be associated with a particular place (mosque) or can be a national or 
international figure, as seen on video or heard on tapes or heard live. PREVENT 
2006 asserts that inspiration from a distance is critical, and there is evidence that 
the rise of the Internet, with its ability to connect people, to transmit ideas 




                                            
between them, and then to distribute those ideas to others, has had a significant 
impact on the accessibility and flow of radical ideas.”91 
One such example is Anwar al-Awlaki, who was westernized and 
produced radical English videos. “Described as the Jack Kennedy of the global 
jihad by Jarrett Brachman, a former researcher at the CIA’s Counterterrorism 
Center and author of Global Jihandism, al-Awlaki’s power lay in his ability to 
connect with ordinary people in the United States and make them feel closer to 
their faith and unfortunately seduce them to violence.”92 Major Nidal Malik 
Hasan’s killing of 13 people at Fort Hood can be counted as one individual who 
had been swayed by al-Awlaki. According to CIA case officer Marc Hageman, 
“just about every plot in the United States was influenced or inspired by him. 
Even after his death, he continues to influence people to commit violence. In 
2011, after al-Awlaki’s death, Jose Pimentel, a Manhattanite and U.S. citizen, 
was planning on building and detonating bombs targeting New York government 
facilities in order to kill soldiers returning home and their families.”93 He learned 
how to make the bombs from Inspire magazine, which was created by al-Awlaki 
and continues to be in publication. Authorities are concerned that al-Awlaki’s 
presence may grow wider even after his death due to his talented oratory skills 
that are forever preserved on the Internet. 
D. UK EFFORTS TO ADDRESS RADICALIZATION 
The factors that can cause a person to become radicalized to the point of 
supporting terrorism or even becoming a terrorist himself or herself are varied, 
counterintuitive to basic assumptions and complicated. In fact, “a study 
conducted by Marc Hageman on more than 500 al-Qa’ida-affiliated terrorists 
discounted economic deprivation, brainwashing, religious knowledge, poor 
education, and sexual frustration as common motivators for terrorist activity. 
91 HM Government, Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy, 10. 
92 Tara McKelvey, “Anwar al-Awlaki Continues to Inspire Islamists,” U.S. News, November 
23, 2011. 
93 The Daily Beast, Man Arrested in N.Y.C. Bomb Plot, November 20, 2011. 
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Contrary to most beliefs, many of the “known terrorists” had studied and lived for 
years in the West, came from middle- to upper-income families, contributed to 
their local community, and were considered completely normal by friends and 
associates.”94 
PREVENT 2006 sought to counter radicalization by addressing the 
structural problems in the United Kingdom and elsewhere that may contribute to 
radicalization. “The first area of action undertaken was the UK government’s 
efforts on an equality agenda and working with communities and the public and 
private sectors to address these wider issues. Efforts included the Faith 
Communities Capacity Building Fund to help improve opportunities and 
strengthen society by reducing inequalities, especially those associated with faith 
and race. It included taking action to help the Muslim community improve their 
educational performance, employment opportunities, and housing conditions. 
Another effort was the Commission on Integration and Cohesion. Its goal was to 
consider how local areas themselves play a role in forging cohesive and resilient 
communities. Finally, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Global 
Opportunities Fund was created to address the political and socio-economic 
environment that extremists exploit. Its goals were to support the development of 
effective, accountable governments; democratic institutions; and the promotion of 
human rights.”95 
The second area of action undertaken to counter radicalization was to 
change the environment in which extremists and those radicalizing others can 
operate; deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others 
to become terrorists. PREVENT 2006 sought to accomplish this by enacting the 
Terrorism Act of 2006 that made it a criminal offense directly or indirectly to 
encourage the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism or to 
disseminate terrorist publications. The Act also made it illegal for certain terrorist 
94Deardorff, The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism, 21. 
95Ibid., 11. 
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groups to operate in the United Kingdom and extended prescription to include 
international terrorist groups, like al-Qa’ida.  
Associated with the Act was “the “List of Unacceptable Behaviors” likely to 
lead an individual to being excluded or deported from the United Kingdom. It 
covered any non-UK citizen using any medium, including writing, producing, 
publishing, or distributing material; public speaking including preaching; running a 
website; using a position of responsibility, such as a teacher, community leader, 
or youth leader, to express views that foment, justify, or glorify terrorist violence 
in furtherance of particular beliefs; seeking to provoke others to terrorist acts; 
fomenting other serious criminal activity or seeking to provoke others to serious 
criminal acts; or fostering hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in 
the UK.”96 
Another action taken in this area involved prisons and radicalization. 
Mosques are not the only places where radicalization occurs. “In 2006, HM 
Prison Services conducted a national training event that provided specialized 
training for Imams in order to support their daily work with all Muslim prisoners. 
Such training was provided to help identify those prisoners susceptible to 
radicalization or extremist views and support them upon their release from prison 
to integrate back into their local community.”97 
The third area of action taken to counter radicalization was the battle of 
ideas. This notion even today is integral. Deardorff stated, “Al Qaeda is not just 
an organization: it is a violent political ideological movement, justified by an 
ultraconservative and anachronistic interpretation of Islam. And despite the fact 
that al Qaeda, as an organization, is ‘greatly diminished,’ the appeal of its 
narrative has increased dramatically during the past half decade.”98 It became, 
and was necessary to challenge, the ideological motivations that extremists 




                                            
believe justify the use of violence. The action was accomplished with several 
meetings with various ministers of Muslim groups. Examples include the Prime 
Minister meeting with twenty-five Muslim community leaders following the 
London bombings in 2005; the Home Secretary meeting with Muslim community 
leaders and agreeing to create seven community-led working groups to develop 
recommendations for tackling extremism among Muslim youth; Ministers for 
Women meeting with Muslim Women’s Network to discuss the role women can 
play in dealing with extremism in Muslim communities; the Prime Minister 
meeting with a group of sixteen- to twenty-five-year-old Muslims to discuss the 
challenges Muslim youth face; and the Prime Minister meeting with forty Muslim 
women to boost understanding of the community.  
In addition to listening to the Muslim community, “the Home Office also 
worked with media organizations to improve perceptions of Muslim communities, 
worked with police on protecting the Muslim community, and consulted with all 
faith communities on the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001.”99 
Finally, “under the banner of “Preventing Extremism Together” the UK 
government had also established a national grassroots campaign targeted at 
Muslim youth, Muslim Forums on Extremism and Islamophobia, and the 
Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board.”100 In addressing interests 
abroad, “PREVENT 2006 worked to support Muslims across the world and in 
areas, such as Kosovo, Pakistan, Turkey, Kashmir, Palestine, Bosnia, Darfur, 
Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq.”101 The United Kingdom provided support along 
with international development assistance and disaster relief to the countries 
listed. 




                                            
E. CONCLUSION 
The UK’s PREVENT program in 2006 was a commendable effort in that it 
sought to address and prevent radicalization at a grassroots level. The United 
Kingdom recognized that in addition to the battlefields their military was fighting 
on in the Middle East, they also recognized there was a battlefield at home as 
well. However, much like the first radical action taken in any effort, it was viewed 
as a good attempt, but its practical effect was negligible. Deardorff discussed 
PREVENT 2006’s strategy,” extensively outlining the challenges and criticisms it 
brought up. One challenge was that it was viewed as discriminatory by some 
Muslims. It was perceived that the UK government was sponsoring Muslim 
organizations on the basis of theological criteria, for example believing Sufis to 
be intrinsically more moderate than Salafis.”102 Another group critical of 
PREVENT 2006 were civil libertarians and free-speech advocates. They 
espoused that those individuals or groups who were open and critical of 
government would risk being labeled “extremist” and risk losing funding.103 
Deardorff’s assessment of PREVENT 2006 was that the effort was a 
positive step in the right direction. Its aim was to “create an alert community that 
is willing to cooperate with government authorities,”104 which anecdotally he 
believed to be happening at that time. However, even at the time of his analysis 
in 2010, there were still groups, both religious and political, who believed that 
PREVENT 2006 risked personal civil liberties and possibly further alienating 
(maybe even radicalizing) members of the Muslim community it sought to work 
with on addressing terrorism. 
This chapter discussed how the United Kingdom made its first attempt at 
addressing radicalization at the domestic level based on what it understood to be 
the factors in causing radicalization. Though they realized these factors and were 
102 Robert B. Dearforff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity” 




                                            
cognizant that the factors alone were not the sole cause of an individual 
supporting terrorism or becoming a terrorist, they nonetheless proceeded to 
include it in their counterterrorism strategy (CONTEST) and implement policy 
targeting these factors. In the process, they faced a mixed bag of negative 
reactions from different interest groups, thus requiring the rewrite of PREVENT 
2006 to address these concerns. The rewrite resulted in the creation of the 
PREVENT 2011 strategy. The next chapter will examine how it fared given the 
substantive changes made based on the criticisms of PREVENT 2006. 
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III. UNITED KINGDOM’S PREVENT 2011 STRATEGY 
“Osama bin Laden may be dead, but the threat from Al Qa’ida 
inspired terrorism is not.”105 
–Theresa May MP, Home Secretary and Minister for Women and 
Equalities, 2011 
A. Rationale for Revised PREVENT in 2011 CONTEST Strategy 
In the previous chapter, the researcher examined the UK’s 2006 
CONTEST strategy in terms of the various environments (cultural, economic, 
educational, and political) and the factors at the time, which may have 
contributed to radicalization of members of the UK Muslim community. It was the 
combination of these environments and radicalization factors that led the UK 
government to assess, develop, and later coordinate the implementation of the 
PREVENT strategy as a viable strategy to combat domestic terrorism.  
However, “on November 9, 2010, the Home Secretary announced a 
review of PREVENT and concluded that it had not been fully effective.”106 The 
Home Secretary’s conclusion was based on expert, independent oversight 
review by Lord Carlile of Berriew QC. “The review began on November 10, 2010, 
and ran for three months. The review involved web-based questionnaires, eleven 
consultation events held around the country, and a series of focus groups.”107 
Based on the review, Theresa May MP stated that, “the PREVENT programme 
[sic] we inherited from the last Government was flawed. It confused the delivery 
of Government policy to promote integration with Government policy to prevent 
terrorism. It failed to confront the extremist ideology at the heart of the threat we 
face; and in trying to reach those at risk of radicalization, funding sometimes 
105 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for 
the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty (London: HM Government, 2011), Forward, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-
strategy-review.pdf. 
106Ibid, Introduction, 4.1. 
107Ibid, Introduction, 4.4. 
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even reached the very extremist organizations that PREVENT should have been 
confronting.”108 
The focus of this chapter are the limitations of the 2006 PREVENT 
strategy that warranted the UK government to undertake significant revisions, the 
new factors that enables the PREVENT strategy in the UK’s 2011 CONTEST to 
be more effective from its 2006 version, and its objectives and implementation. 
The limitations of PREVENT 2006 stemmed from the reactions of several groups 
that PREVENT 2006 (1) focused too narrowly on the Muslim community, (2) was 
a vehicle for spying on communities, (3) misallocated funding, (4) lacked an 
effective integration strategy, and (5) failed to address radicalization overseas, 
especially in North and West Africa. The research proposes that the development 
of PREVENT 2011 also stemmed from the realization that the United Kingdom 
was involved in an “irregular warfare” situation and needed to adjust its strategy 
accordingly. 
1. Focusing Too Narrowly on the Muslim Community 
The PREVENT 2006 strategy “was considered by many to be 
disproportionate in that it stigmatized communities, suggesting they alone were 
collectively at risk of radicalization and implied terrorism was a problem specific 
to Muslim communities.”109  “Further negative consequences of PREVENT 2006 
focusing narrowly on the Muslim community led to viewing the Muslim community 
as a “suspect community” by government and security forces and the media, 
fostering social divisions among Muslims themselves and between Muslims and 
others, encouraging tokenism, facilitating violations of privacy and professional 
norms of confidentiality, discouraging local democracy, and being counter-
productive in reducing the risk of political violence.”110 
108 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, Foreword. 
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In 2010, information had become available that further substantiated the 
need to reexamine PREVENT 2006’s focus on the Muslim community. “A 2010 
Citizenship Survey showed that support for all kinds of violent extremism was 
prevalent, not only among the young but among all lower socio-economic and 
income groups and not just Muslim groups. Open source data from 2000 to 2010 
on people convicted of Islamist terrorism-related offenses show that most 
offenses were committed by men under the age of 30. Most were British. Almost 
25 percent had links to Pakistan—either as British nationals with Pakistani 
heritage or Pakistani nationals—and almost 15 percent had links to East Africa 
(notably Somalia). Almost 50 percent of the sample were residents in London at 
the time of their offense, notably in the north or northeast of the City; 13 percent 
were residents in the West Midlands (12% in Birmingham), 9 percent in 
Yorkshire/Humber, and 7 percent in the South East. Just over one-third of the 
group that were British citizens and just under one-third of the total for whom 
information on education was available had attended a university or institute of 
higher education. Fewer than half were either in employment or full-time 
education. Thirty-five percent were unemployed.”111 It can be inferred from both 
the Citizenship Survey and the open source data that extremism was not 
confined to the Muslim community. 
“The inference also was supported by a majority (80%) of respondents to 
the PREVENT 2011 consultation who believed that PREVENT should have 
addressed a wider range of threats, including not only al-Qa’ida but also violence 
from extreme right-wing or other ethnic or religious organizations.”112 
2. Accusations of Spying on Communities 
The issue was raised in an article in the British newspaper, The Guardian, 
“that stated PREVENT 2006’s efforts for “information gathering was directed at 
the innocent and the spying was directed at people because of their religion and 
111 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, The Context, Scale, 5.30. 
112 Ibid, Guiding Principle: A Framework for Prevent, The aim and scope of Prevent, 6.10. 
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not because of their behavior.”113“The information collected included political and 
religious views; information on mental health, sexual activity, and associates; and 
other sensitive information, all of which could be stored until the people 
concerned reach the age of 100.”114 Traditionally, in Britain, “intelligence is 
gathered by the police and security services, but through PREVENT 2006 it was 
able to turn community, religious, and voluntary groups into information or 
intelligence providers.”115 In fact, “PREVENT 2006 had earned the unique 
distinction of being the biggest domestic spying program that targeted the 
thoughts and beliefs of the innocent in Britain in modern times.”116 
3. Misallocation of Funds 
With a budget in 2008–2009 of $140 million, PREVENT 2006 was to 
mobilize communities to oppose the ideologies of violent extremism. “Despite the 
UK government’s claim that its efforts were community led, the allocation of 
funds to local authorities had not been driven by a decision-making process in 
which local agencies identified their own needs and accessed central 
government funds accordingly.”117  “Rather, local authorities were pressured to 
adopt PREVENT 2006 in direct proportion to the numbers of Muslims in the area, 
thereby constructing the Muslim population as a “suspect community.”118 In 
essence, a local authority had to describe their environmental situation as dire 
based on the number of Muslims in the area to secure funding, thus portraying all 
Muslims in the area as suspect. 
Once the funds were issued, “local authorities used the funding to provide 
“targeted capacity building of Muslim communities,” focusing particularly on 
113 Vikram Dodd, “Government Anti-Terrorism Strategy ‘Spies’ on Innocent,” The Guardian, 
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young people, women, and mosques. Serious problems arose, however, when 
deprived communities with many needs could only secure the funding via the 
voluntary sector by signing up for PREVENT’s counterterrorism agenda.”119 In 
addition, many of the projects that were funded were geared toward cohesion 
rather than counterterrorism.  
It was from an examination of the projects funded that PREVENT funding 
should not go towards wider objectives of promoting integration and community 
cohesion. This created the impression that the UK government was supporting 
cohesion projects only for security reasons and in effect “securtising [sic] 
integration.”120 Examples abound on “how funding for cohesion projects and 
faith-based projects could be obtained only by using counterterrorism funds and 
sometimes by dealing with counterterrorism officials and police officers.”121 
In March 2010, the House of Commons Select Committee for 
Communities and Local Government report on PREVENT stated that “much 
PREVENT money has been wasted on unfocused or irrelevant projects as a 
result either of misunderstanding of PREVENT or of a lack of willingness and 
capacity of local organizations to deliver.”122 
4. Lack of an Effective Integration Strategy 
An effective integration strategy attempts to incorporate the strategies of 
an organization’s various units to share resources and provide greater return on 
investment for the organization as a whole. In the case of PREVENT 2006, it had 
a budget of $140 million in 2008–2009 that focused on mobilizing 
communities/sectors/institutions to oppose the ideology of violent extremism, 
promote shared values, and respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism. 
119Kundnani, “Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism.” 
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The effort involved a number of organizations and individuals tasked with 
carrying out the aforementioned goals. 
In every case, the evaluation of any social or preventative program is 
inherently challenging. Unlike the “hard” sciences where hard-numbered data is 
used, success in the “soft sciences” often is reflected in changing attitudes as 
much as behaviors and attitudes that are complex to measure and assess. “So 
while many efforts have been made to evaluate the effectiveness of PREVENT 
2006, the only description that can be used to describe its success is patchy.”123 
Progress had been made in measuring outputs but not always measuring 
outcomes. In the rush to implement PREVENT 2006, adequate monitoring and 
evaluation processes had not been built into the strategy to see if what was being 
done was actually making a difference. It was a bad combination of generous 
funding, a multitude of actors and organizations, and the need to show quick 
results that eventually led to quality control issues at all levels of the strategy. 
5. Addressing Radicalization Overseas 
Extensive polling has been conducted overseas to gauge support for al-
Qa’ida. “While some studies have shown that al-Qa’ida’s influence is declining, 
other countries have shown a high level of support; for example, Nigeria (49%), 
Jordan (34%), and Egypt (20%).124 It was determined that these high levels of 
support and elsewhere could have impacted the radicalization process in the 
United Kingdom.  A large number of people who have engaged in terrorism in the 
United Kingdom have come to the United Kingdom from overseas, notably from 
countries in the Muslim-majority world, which had been affected by conflict and 
instability. Most of those convicted in the United Kingdom between 1999 and 
2009 were British nationals, but fewer than half were born in the United 
123 HM Government, Prevent Strategy,6.71. 
124 Ibid, 5.19 
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Kingdom.”125  “Similar percentages have been found among people who have 
engaged in terrorist-related activity and who have not been convicted.”126 
Many people who had been radicalized in the United Kingdom had been 
significantly influenced by propagandists of terrorism who are based overseas. 
“In many cases they had spent time in a current or historic theater of conflict in 
the Muslim-majority world.”127  “Some had been influenced based on the time 
they spent in religious institutions in their countries and before they settled in the 
United Kingdom. Many had been recruited while they had been traveling or 
resident overseas. It is these connections that highlight the key fact that 
PREVENT work in the United Kingdom is often dependent on essential 
PREVENT work overseas, conducted by the United Kingdom, by other 
governments, or by multilateral organizations.”128 
The research also proposes that the UK’s response to extremism and 
political instability in North and West Africa warranted an upgrade to the 2006 
PREVENT strategy. Up until 2011, British interests overseas have been targeted 
by terrorist organizations. At its current pace, North and West Africa are set to 
become prime terrorist breeding grounds for future terrorist training camps due to 
the proliferation of madrassas in the area. 
The update of the 2006 PREVENT strategy “stemmed from the UK’s 
terrorism assessment. At that time the United Kingdom faced a broad range of 
terrorist threats, with the most serious coming from al-Qa’ida, its affiliates, and 
like-minded organizations”129 who sought to radicalize and recruit people to their 
cause. Based on more information not available or known prior to 2006, “the UK 
had become more familiar with the factors that encouraged people to support 
125 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, 5.32. 
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terrorism and to engage in terrorism-related activities.”130 What the United 
Kingdom and the world had witnessed was that terrorism had evolved, thus 
making PREVENT 2006 that much more difficult to implement (irregular warfare). 
“The UK had assessed that radicalization is driven by an ideology which 
sanctions the use of violence; by propagandists for that ideology here and 
overseas; and by personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors which, for a 
range of reasons, make that ideology seem both attractive and compelling.”131 
The United Kingdom further admitted that evidence showed that support for 
terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, integrated, multi-faith society 
and of parliamentary democracy. “Terrorist groups have shown that they can 
take up and exploit ideas which have been developed and sometimes 
popularized by extremist organizations that operate legally in the UK.”132 In their 
conclusion, “their efforts to deal with radicalization will depend on developing a 
sense of belonging to the UK and support for its core values.”133 
The UK’s terrorism assessment that warranted an upgrade to the 2006 
PREVENT strategy “stemmed also from the UK’s response to extremism and 
political stability, especially in North and West Africa. In testimony offered by 
RafaelloPantucci to the British Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, he 
describes how the threat to British interests abroad was being impacted by the 
evolution of terrorism in these areas.”134According to Pantucci, “British security 
and intelligence (SIA) agencies were not aware of the threat of North African 
terrorism to the UK interests at home and overseas.”135 As stated earlier,”even 
with bin Laden and al-Awlaki no longer leading al-Qa’ida, terrorism has 
130 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, 3.4. 
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disaggregated and diversified throughout the world, which poses a challenge for 
the SIA who have limited resources. However, the link between North Africa and 
UK domestic terrorism was revealed through Abu Hamza Al-Masri at the 
Finsbury Park Mosque in North London. Abu Doha, RachidRamda, and 
RabahKadre represented a number of North Africans with formative experience 
and expertise from undertaking jihad in Afghanistan and/or Bosnia who were 
linked to the mosque. Actually, Abu Doha was believed to be a key figure in a 
network of plots that stretched across Europe, North America, and as far as the 
Khalden training camp in Afghanistan.”136 The mosque was a place where al-
Qa’ida-linked recruiters would operate and that KamelBourgass used as a postal 
address and photocopy shop for his poison recipes.  
However, as time passed the terrorist threat adapted. According to 
Jonathan Evans, the Director General of the Security Service, “the threat is 
becoming less monolithic but more widespread. Al-Qa’ida affiliates in Yemen, 
Somalia, and the Sahel have become more dangerous as al-Qa’ida’s presence in 
Pakistan has declined, and increasing levels of cooperation are being witnessed 
between al-Qa’ida groups in various parts of the world.”137 The most prominent 
international terrorist network in North Africa “is al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM). Led by Abu Qatada, also known as Omar Mahmoud Othman, AQIM has 
singled out the United Kingdom for direct punishment in its rhetoric. He is 
currently serving in detention, awaiting extradition to Jordan for his alleged role in 
terrorist plots in the country.”138 However, even without Qatada, AQIM has 
committed acts of terrorism against the British, even after the passing of 
PREVENT 2011, such as follows:139 
• “On January 22, 2009, an AQIM cell snatched a group of tourists 
that included British national Edwin Dyer. While the rest of the 






                                            
tourists were released, Dyer was brutally executed in late May 2009 
when the UK did not meet the demands of the AQIM cell to pay a 
ransom and release Abu Qatada.” 
• “In April 2012, the AQIM cell repeated this terrorist act to free their 
cleric when they snatched Stephen Malcolm, a dual British-South 
African national, in November 2011.” 
While it is not clear whether groups like this in North and West Africa have 
either the capacity or intention to launch attacks, they do seem to target their 
efforts at foreigners through kidnappings/killings and the targeting of Western 
corporate interests as a means of gaining attention and as reprisals. Examples 
include the following:140 
• “In late May 2013, MokhtarBelmokhtar’s“Signed in Blood 
Battalion’s” suicide attack against a military base in Agadez and a 
French run (the company Areva) uranium mine in Arlit killing 21 
people.” 
• “In December 2011, al-Qa’ida in the Land Beyond the Sahel 
claimed to be holding British national Chris McManus. In March 
2012, British Special Forces mounted an assault to rescue 
McManus that unfortunately ended with his death.”141 
• “In June 2012, an assault on Dominic Asquith, British Ambassador 
to Libya.”142 
• “In September 2012, the death of American Ambassador to Libya, 
Chris Stevens.”143 
• “In February 2013, a group of British, Italian, Greek, and Lebanese 
nationals were snatched from a construction site in northwestern 
Nigeria. All were executed on the basis of a claimed visible British 
support for the government in Nigeria.”144 
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Finally, within many lawless areas of the country, training camps have 
begun to grow, with reports of Nigerian extremists training at camps in Timbuktu, 
Mali. The proliferation of training camps growing unchecked presents more 
opportunities for those individuals who have become radicalized into supporting 
terrorist groups by undergoing training to carry out al-Qa’ida’s mission. In fact, in 
a plot disrupted in April 2012, a group planning to carry out a terrorist plot spoke 
of going to AQIM for training versus Pakistan. Despite Syria’s efforts to offer a 
more tempting and active battlefield for aspiring British jihadists, given the 
ongoing British connections to Libya and opportunities offered in the broader 
Sahel, it is possible that the area will be much more attractive for individuals to 
seek training. 
Pantucci’s analysis via AQIM supports the thesis of this research in that a 
“counter-terrorism response needs to focus on a number of aspects that strike a 
balance between protecting national interests abroad and dealing with the 
political realities at home.”145 Just like the U.S. public, “the British public will no 
longer support long-term heavy military engagement in foreign nations from 
where the direct threat to their country is opaque.”146 The result “must be a light 
foot approach focused on training to develop local capacity and on understanding 
how the threat is set to develop.”147 In the longer term, this would involve “a clear 
focus on stabilization and development that will help resolve age-old regional 
disputes, and in turn reduce the space available for Islamist groups to move 
in.”148 
Pantucci offers five approaches that can accomplish this task. Of the five, 
the one that supports this research was “recognizing the role of local 
communities.”Pantucci states that in “PREVENT terms the growing priority and 






                                            
focus placed upon North and West Africa in counterterrorism terms requires a 
parallel push for the North and West Africa communities to understand British 
foreign policy in the region and feel that their views in turn are being heard and 
understood.”149  Pantucci believes that if engaged positively, they can play a key 
role in protecting Britain’s interests. He predicts, “without robust counter-narrative 
work and effective counterterrorism-informed community policing, there is a risk 
that the issue of the “home grown” South Asian terrorism of 2005 onwards will be 
witnessed again in the North and West African community.”150 It is this prediction 
that may have driven the revamping of PREVENT in 2011. 
It is the stark reality that “groups, such as AQIM, Ansar Dine, Movement 
for Oneness, Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and “Signed in Blood 
Battalion,”Ansaru, and Boko Haram operate in a territory that is almost the size of 
Europe and are coupled with strong smuggling and nomadic traditions that make 
them adept at slipping back and forth across porous desert borders.”151 It is from 
this environmental reality that the researcher believes the Home Office 
recognized that there are simply not enough military and intelligence resources to 
address the entire gamut of terrorism around the world. Part of this dilemma 
stems from what was stated at the beginning of this research where terrorism is 
evolving and subsequently changing the face of warfare, thus warranting new 
approaches.  
PREVENT 2011 seeks “to address this issue through better 
communication of the UK’s security and foreign policies to rebut claims made 
about them and challenge terrorist ideologies.”152 This has come in the form of 
the creation of the Research Information and Communications Unit (RICU) that 
was established in the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home 
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Office in 2007. Its function is “to coordinate government communications about 
the terrorist threat and the UK’s response to it and facilitate and generate 
challenges to terrorist ideology and the claims made by terrorist groups.”153  
“RICU has had a central role in developing counter-ideological or counter-
narrative work.”154 However, its impact has been variable due to its lack of 
precision around target audiences and messages. It has been a struggle to 
analyze its impact and evaluate its effectiveness. Regardless, through PREVENT 
2011, RICU has implemented better programs and evaluative techniques to 
better measure its effectiveness. 
PREVENT 2011 is in position and designed to better explain foreign policy 
to British domestic audiences. Tools of foreign policy often employ the sticks-
and-carrots, direct and indirect, hard and soft power approaches through the 
military instrument. Today, “most nations’“sticks” (hard power) are executed in 
general direct approaches becoming increasingly lethal, and the carrots (soft 
power) executed in general indirect approaches are limp and looking a little 
rotten.”155 In a sense, many nations find themselves at a strategic 
inflection/tipping point. To address this issue, nations must boost their carrot-
indirect-soft power engagement or risk their global influence to wane. 
In addition, according to Robert Sharpe, “the Islamic world is undergoing a 
transition, in some cases very intelligently, by what he would describe as 
benevolent monarchies. In the less benevolent monarchies, the issues are more 
about power, resources, sectarianism, and standing in the Islamic world rather 
than the “haves” and “have-nots.”“156  “With the Arab republics experiencing the 
most unrest, they are where the most work is needed and the most change can 
occur. Most remain very vulnerable. Good governance provides the solution in all 
153 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, 8.28. 
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cases, but in most cases good governance is merely an aspiration.”157 Good 
governance is not just a new idea in some of these countries; there also is a lack 
of government capacity and capability. In his view, there will be many more 
revolutions and counter-revolutions to come. The point here is that “engagement 
has been less effective than many would have liked, and it is suggested that it is 
because nations actually have reduced or at least appeared to have reduced 
their ability, competence, and capacity to engage and gain trust indirectly with 
carrots as soft power.”158 PREVENT 2011 seeks to address this issue through 
identifying priority areas in education, faith, health, criminal justice, and charities 
and providing governmental support. 
Finally, PREVENT 2011 can utilize the power of propaganda to help 
advance the UK’s response to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the 
threat from those who promote it. Propaganda’s role in history in and of itself can 
warrant a study on its own. For the purposes of this research, it will cite David 
Welch who states that, “‘Propaganda is ethically neutral,’ it is not intrinsically 
good or bad, for it is simply the communication of a message; what is important 
is to spot persuasion, bias and untruth when it occurs, and to think about who 
might have a monopoly on its dissemination, and thus on power. Historically, it’s 
almost always been a pejorative word: ‘our side’ produces information and ‘your 
side’ produces propaganda. Our government tells the truth, yours tells lies.”159 
Propaganda has been compelled to change in recent decades. “Citizens 
have instead become skeptical of “spin” and “public relations,” and they are right 
to be, for it serves the exact same purpose: to shape information in the interests 
of those holding the megaphone.”160“Propaganda has had to adapt to meet its 
audience in much the same way as commercial advertising has done: the human 
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brain in the consumer age has evolved to become much more resistant to the 
simplistic messages of the 1930s.”161“Political communications must now drive at 
the heart of an individual’s desire and aspiration, as modern advertising does, 
rather than simply and plainly stating the merits and specifics of a particular 
politician, policy, or party, as they would have done in the past.”162 
The use of propaganda by terrorist organizations has taken political 
communications to a much higher level. “By making sure that terrorist attacks are 
filmed and then widely disseminated, al-Qa’ida—and other “insurgent” groups, 
such as the Taliban—take the battle of ideas into the media.”163 The content of 
the attacks may be simple, the footage grainy and dark, but it is the 
dissemination that is so important. Neville Bolt, in his book The Violent Image, 
quotes at length from jihadi Internet forums that show the attacks, “raids” in their 
jargon, as merely the first step in the process. “We expect you to be like beehives 
during the raid,” writes a forum moderator. “One person takes part in 
distributing…another generates links…one person writes an article. People must 
feel and notice that the forums have changed radically during this blessed raid. 
The raid is dependent on you.”164 
Thus, “the original attack becomes merely the spark. The real propaganda 
comes after. Indeed, for Bolt, such is the importance of the dispersal of the act 
across the media that he views the attack as the mere beginning.”165  “The entire 
operation might be born in an explosion of blood and bone, but the central event 
is the media dispersal.”166 For “Bolt and, to an extent, the terrorist organization, 
propaganda requires two things: an act and a viewer.”167 It is not enough to 
161Hancox, “From Stamps to Social Media, the History of Propaganda.” 
162 Ibid. 
163 Faisal al Yafai, “The Violent Image Explores Use of Pictures As Propaganda,” The 






                                            
merely destroy a tank or blow up a building. Terrorist propaganda requires 
viewers. 
The UK’s RICU via PREVENT 2011 addresses this new use of 
propaganda by terrorist organizations “by running a range of projects designed to 
challenge terrorist ideology online through effective counter-narratives, positive 
messaging from credible sources, and critical analyses of extremist 
propaganda.”168 
This discussion has presented information that PREVENT 2011 was a 
product of addressing the limitations of PREVENT 2006, where it was accused of 
(1) focusing too narrowly on the Muslim community, (2) being a vehicle for spying 
on communities, (3) misallocated funding, (4) lacking an effective integration 
strategy, and (5) failing to address radicalization overseas, especially in North 
and West Africa. The research also proposed that the development of PREVENT 
2011 stemmed from the realization that the United Kingdom was involved in an 
irregular warfare situation and adjusted its strategy accordingly. Based on these 
issues, the new PREVENT 2011 strategy was adopted by the UK government. 
B. NEW FACTORS OF PREVENT 2011 
The 2011 PREVENT strategy has thirteen guiding principles which are 
consolidated into the nine bullet points below.  
• “PREVENT will always be part of the UK counterterrorism strategy 
with the aim of stopping people from becoming terrorists or 
supporting terrorists.”169 
• “Though it will address all forms of terrorism, it will concentrate a 
majority of its resources and efforts to preventing people from 
joining or supporting al-Qa’ida, its affiliates, or related groups.”170 
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• “It will be committed to protecting freedom of speech in the UK. But 
preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist (and non-
violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology. PREVENT 
will also mean intervening to stop people moving from extremist 
groups or from extremism into terrorist-related activity.”171 
• “PREVENT will allocate resources proportionate to the threat, and 
at present the greatest threat is al-Qa’ida.”172 
• “To prevent a mistake in the past, PREVENT must not assume 
control of or allocate funding to integration projects which have a 
value far wider than security and counterterrorism; the Government 
will not securitize its integration strategy.”173 
• “PREVENT must not be used as a means for covert spying on 
people or communities.”174 
• “The Government’s commitment to localism will support the 
PREVENT strategy.”175 
• “PREVENT will be funded from the Home Office and other 
departments. Grants will be made available for local authority 
PREVENT work. Evaluation of PREVENT activity to date has been 
poor; money has been wasted. Funding and other support will not 
be provided to extremist organizations.”176 
• “The process of radicalization in the UK often has overseas 
connections. To be effective, PREVENT must take place overseas 
as well as in the UK. However, that type of work has not been 
effective to date and funds have been wasted.”177 
C. OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The objectives of the 2011 PREVENT strategy are to178 
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• “Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat 
the UK faces from those who promote it; 
• Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure they 
are given appropriate advice and support; and 
• Work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of 
radicalization which must be addressed.” 
The UK’s efforts to achieve Objective 1 are to challenge the ideology of 
terrorist groups. While previous work on this has made some progress, it has not 
been consistent or reached those individuals most susceptible to radicalization. 
PREVENT 2011 “proposes that much more work needs to be done in this area, 
but it must be proportionate and focused.”179 The strategy to advance this 
objective “is to include better communication of government security and foreign 
policies to rebut claims made about them; more projects in education, 
communities, and the criminal justice system to enable understanding of and 
challenge to terrorist ideology; and support for experts where ideology draws on 
and misrepresents theology and requires a detailed response.”180 
The basis of achieving Objective 2 is that “the UK believes radicalization is 
usually a process and not an event.”181 It is proposed that intervention during the 
radicalization process can prevent vulnerable people from being drawn into 
terrorist-related activity. However, programs to address this are new, and 
evidence of the programs’ impact is limited.  
In fact, part of the reason that PREVENT 2006 was updated was due to 
the accusation that these programs served as vehicles for spying into those 
targeted groups.  
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Finally, the success of Objective 3 is based on working with key sectors. 
“The key sectors identified are education, faith, health, criminal justice, and 
charities.”182  “Some progress has been made in these key sectors with the 
Internet being proposed as a key sector in its own right, providing the vehicle for 
delivery of programs for these key sectors.”183 
In order to ensure that PREVENT 2011 “will accomplish its objectives, its 
actions continue to be coordinated by the Office for Security and Counter-
Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office, and the Home Secretary will be the lead 
Minister.”184  “Funding for PREVENT 2011 was to come from three main areas: 
local authority work in association with communities, policing, and work 
overseas. The first two areas were to be funded by the Home Office, while the 
third was to be funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).”185   
The objectives and implementation of PREVENT 2011 were based “on its 
prioritization of the risks faced by the United Kingdom and not (as has been the 
case) on the basis of demographics.”186 
D. CONCLUSION 
The focus of this chapter examined the limitations of the 2006 PREVENT 
strategy that warranted the UK government to undertake significant revisions 
resulting in the new 2011 PREVENT strategy. The result of these revisions led to 
the creation of PREVENT 2011 that addressed the limitations of PREVENT 2006 
that (1) had focused too narrowly on the Muslim community, (2) was accused of 
being a vehicle for spying on communities, (3) misallocated funding, (4) lacked 
an effective integration strategy, and (5) failed to address radicalization overseas, 
especially in North and West Africa. The research also proposes that the United 
182 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, Objective Three: Supporting sectors and institutions 
where there are risks of radicalisation, Summary. 
183 Ibid, Summary. 
184 Ibid, 3.41. 
185 Ibid, 3.44. 
186 Ibid, 3.42. 
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Kingdom realized that the War on Terror required them to conduct an irregular 
warfare campaign reflective of warfare in the twenty-first century.  
The next chapter will examine the current U.S. Strategic Counterterrorism 
Strategy and its goals, and, most importantly, how it intends to advance them. 
The research will examine the issues, challenges, metrics, stakeholders, and 
projected outcomes of the SCC. Through this discussion, further analysis will be 
explored into how the UK’s experience with the 2011 and 2006 PREVENT 
strategy can lead to the possible creation and implementation of a U.S. version. 
 60 
IV. WHY THE U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR 
COUNTERTERRORISM DOES NOT PROVIDE THE COUNTER 
RADICALIZATION MEASURES REQUIRED IN TODAY’S NEW 
DOMESTIC BATTLEFIELD 
“Our terrorist adversaries have shown themselves to be agile and 
adaptive; defeating them requires that we develop and pursue a 
strategy that is even more agile and adaptive.”187 
–U.S. President Barack Obama 
National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
What has been covered to this point is how “the UK developed, 
implemented, and revised their PREVENT strategy to directly address the 
principle threat to the United Kingdom of radicalized individuals who are using a 
distorted and unrepresentative version of the Islamic faith to justify violence”188 
against the United Kingdom both abroad and domestically. The UK’s PREVENT 
strategy seeks to address radicalization as a significant component in combating 
terrorism. The PREVENT element strategy seeks “to actively counter the rhetoric 
in order to influence individuals from becoming terrorists or supporting 
terrorism.”189 It is based and vetted through the UK’s past and present dealings 
with domestic terrorism as well as the growing ease and presence of 
radicalization on the Web and what it can make people do. It is also based on the 
Security Service’s belief that “the terrorist groups operating in Britain today are 
different in many important respects both from Islamist extremist activity in other 
parts of the world and from historical terrorist movements, such as the IRA or the 
Red Army Faction.”190 This is evidenced by the 2013 Birmingham 
187 The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: The White 
House, 2011), 1–26, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf. 
188 Ibid. 
189 UK Home Office, Protecting the UK Against Terrorism. 
190 Ibid. 
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plotters’bombing attempt, which showed that terrorism is still active, especially in 
the United Kingdom. 
Faced with a similar amorphous threat, the United States lacks a coherent 
domestic counter-radicalization strategy similar to PREVENT. The United States 
must develop such a counter-radicalization strategy to reinforce, integrate, and 
complement public communication efforts that focuses on countering the rhetoric 
of al-Qa’ida, its affiliates and adherents, other international terrorist organizations 
and violent extremists overseas. The United States must then “confront the al-
Qa’ida rhetoric by providing tools, techniques, methods and programs for all U.S. 
government communicators, both domestic and international to advance the U.S. 
message.”191 However, the U.S.’s messaging efforts are challenged by the 
variety of al-Qa’ida’s rhetoric. Their rhetoric often involves the seven major 
“sources of tension that ranges from violent extremism, the situation between the 
Israelis’, Palestinians, and the Arab world, the rights and responsibilities of 
nations on nuclear weapons, democracy, religious freedom, women’s rights and 
economic opportunity.”192Thus, the problem becomes, how can the United 
States restructure its strategy to win the war of “hearts and minds” within the 
United States? Can it develop a counterterrorism strategy that implements 
counter-radicalization techniques and counter-strategic communications as part 
of its strategy to address al Qa’ida’s rhetoric? The rhetoric often is linked to rising 
instances of homegrown terrorism within the U.S. borders and international al-
Qa’ida-affiliated terrorism that may threaten U.S. interests abroad as well.  
What is needed is a strategy that counters the communications put out by 
al-Qa’ida that targets those individuals in the domestic front who may be prone to 
support terrorism. After Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is less likely to 
mount a full scale military operation because it is too costly in terms of budgets 
as well as the personal turmoil that impacts military personnel and the general 
191“Organization Description.” 
192Obama, “Prepared Remarks to the Muslim World.” 
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population. The United States must develop a counter-radicalization strategy to 
fight in this new type of irregular warfare at home. 
The issue, therefore, is not to have the most powerful military today but 
rather the most relevant strategy at the point of necessity—a point that this 
research proposes as counter radicalization and strategic counterterrorism 
communications. To have that, “the U.S. needs a strategy in place that is not 
necessarily “ready for combat” at any given moment but instead is most able to 
adapt to the events of tomorrow”193 domestically as well as internationally.  
However, the only current U.S. strategy that can guide the United States 
handle the terrorist events of tomorrow is the U.S. National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism. However, the basis of this strategy is grounded on the U.S. 
experience abroad, that is, internationally. The effectiveness of this strategy has 
proven to be limited due to the U.S. international strategy not reflecting the 
actions taken by the U.S. government domestically. There is essentially a 
“disconnect” between what is written and what is actually done in the United 
States. For the purposes of this research, this chapter will provide a critical 
analysis of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Strategy through the lens of a 
domestic target. It will also propose that this cannot be accomplished at the 
federal level. Therefore, the responsibility for domestic counter radicalization 
rests, due to the abdication of the federal authorities, with local government. 
Development of the counter radicalization and counterterrorism strategic 
communications as a result must be driven by community relations bottom up 
and not top down. 
B. ANALYSIS OF U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
According to Deardorff, “globalization, electronic media, and ease of trade 
and travel have exposed various cultures to one another more rapidly, more 
frequently, and in greater depth today than at any other time in 
193 Thomas E. Ricks, “Heed the History Lesson: A Smaller Military is Better,” Sun-Sentinel 
Newspaper, December 12, 2013, 13A. 
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history.”194“Through this technologically advanced and interconnected world, 
grievances (real or imagined) can be shared instantaneously, and even small 
numbers of violent actors have the potential to do great damage.”195 In addition, 
while the general public could simply blame Islam because it would be expedient, 
easier, and less controversial than reexamining the core political issues and 
grievances that resonate much in the Muslim world, it is hardly practical in the 
long run and would degrade U.S.-Muslim relations further. Therefore, the 
challenge is to determine “how the U.S. can mount a “relevant” counterterrorism 
strategy that addresses these twenty-first century realities taking into account 
that the Muslim community makes up less than one percent of the U.S. general 
population.”196 
The USCS outlined in the June 2011 National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism and signed off by President Barack Obama attempts to address 
these realities. The USCS positions itself that this strategy will be more focused. 
“It supports the claim by declaring that the U.S. is not at “war” with the tactic of 
terrorism or the religion of Muslim but at war against a specific organization—al-
Qa’ida.”197 The strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa’ida and its 
affiliates and adherents will require the concerted efforts of allies, partners, and 
multilateral institutions. It also includes specific areas of focus tailored to the 
regions, domains, and groups that are most important to achieving the strategy’s 
goals. To accomplish this, the strategy is directed by four guiding principles, 
overarching goals, and several areas of focus.  
The four guiding principles that lead the strategy are “adhering to U.S. 
core values, building security partnerships, applying counterterrorism tools and 
capabilities appropriately, and building a culture of resilience.”198 The areas of 






                                            
focus identified by the strategy are “the Homeland, South Asia, Arabian 
Peninsula, East Africa, Europe, Iraq, Maghreb and Sahel, Southeast Asia, 
Central Asia, and Information and Ideas.”199 It is the Information and Ideas focus 
this research examines, since it is this principle that can “adapt to the events of 
tomorrow” within the Homeland. 
The following section reviews the principles and how the domestic Muslim 
communities (or those prone to disenfranchisement) may view these principles.  
1. Four Guiding Principles of USCS 
a. Adhering to U.S. Core Values200 
The principle of adhering to U.S. core values “refers to the power and 
appeal of the U.S. values of freedom, fairness, equality, dignity, hope, and 
opportunity that are woven into the fabric of U.S. society.”201 The USCS counts 
on offering these values when terrorists offer injustice, disorder, and destruction. 
Under this guiding principle, there are five subheadings to help advance this 
principle. 
(1) Respect for Human Rights.202 The USCS declares its respect for 
universal rights in the hopes of contrasting it against the actions of al-Qa’ida, its 
affiliates and adherents, and other terrorist organizations. By positioning the U.S. 
agenda that supports the rights of free speech, assembly, and democracy with 
the death and destruction offered by terrorists, it is believed that it will help 
undermine and undercut their appeal. However, the success of this depends 
upon the U.S. matching its words with actions.” 
Discussion: Examples at home abound on the hypocrisy of this 
subheading; that is, the U.S. use of inhumane interrogation methods undermine 






                                            
reports of police departments overstepping the lines, trampling over the rights of 
individuals, and then covering their actions through lies and deception. All these 
examples undermine U.S. Muslims belief in the rule of U.S. law. 
(2) Encouraging Responsive Governance.203 Through the promotion of 
a representative, responsive government, the USCS is able to more successfully 
meet its goals. The USCS contends that when governments are responsive to 
the needs of their citizens, it diminishes the discontent of their people and thus 
weakens those negative feelings that al-Qa’ida actively seeks to exploit.” 
Discussion: Whether examining federal, state, or local levels of 
government, there are plenty of examples where each level of government has 
been unresponsive to the needs of the population it serves. The 
unresponsiveness at the federal level is validated by the 113th Congress being 
the least productive body in history by only passing fifty-five laws due to partisan 
politics. Their inability to cooperate and pass laws to help the general public with 
employment, housing, immigration, and so forth, has led to an increase in the 
number of American “patriot” extremist groups, according to the Southern 
Poverty Law Center who count 1,360 “patriot” extremist groups in 2012, up by 7 
percent from 2011.204 These groups oftentimes target those who are of different 
color, country of origin, and worship differently as the source of the problems 
caused by the U.S. government’s unresponsiveness. Their race crimes may 
generate further radicalization against the U.S. government, which they claim 
they are acting to protect. 
(3) Respect for Privacy Rights, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights.205 
These are critical components of the USCS. They are needed to maintain the 
support of the American people for the efforts carried out by the USCS.” 
203“Organization Description.” 
204Callie Carmichael, “Anti Government Extremist Groups Reach Record Levels, Say 




                                            
Discussion: There has been a longstanding history of unacceptable 
intrusion of government into American’s lives (i.e., Watergate), with the use of 
facial recognition software at the 2001 Super Bowl, license plate tracking, and so 
forth. Recently, former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden’s 
alleged whistleblowing act, where he released an estimated 1.7 million classified 
documents, showed how the NSA carried out surveillance aimed at foreign 
governments and their leaders.206 What was more surprising of Snowden’s 
whistleblowing was when information also came out about how the NSA carried 
out surveillance on American citizens as well. Another example includes the use 
of drones by local law enforcement. These drones had been credited with helping 
eliminate terrorists overseas. But so fearful and distrustful are U.S. citizens of 
their own local law enforcement having use of these drones that many cities have 
now passed laws that protect air space and prevent the use of drones without a 
warrant. If non-Muslims have this level of distrust of their own local law 
enforcement, the U.S. Muslim population is considerably higher. It is easy for 
them to feel this way when they witness inappropriate surveillance of their 
mosques, FBI sting operations on Muslims, and use of national security laws to 
incarcerate them without due process. It is the U.S. government’s flagrant 
disregard for privacy rights, civil liberties, and civil rights that empowers the 
ACLU to be much stronger in the United States than in the United Kingdom. 
(4) Balancing Security and Transparency.207 The USCS states that a 
well-informed American public is a source of its strength, based on the notion 
that democratic institutions function best in an environment of transparency and 
open discussion of national issues. From this, the USCS plans to make 
information available to the American people about the threats they face and the 
steps being taken to mitigate those threats. However, the USCS tempers it with 
the fact that in some cases information must be protected from disclosure to 
206 Ken Dilanian and Richard A. Serrano, “Report: NSA Leaks Hurt Terror, Crime Fight,” 
South Florida Sun-Sentinel, January 10, 2014, 6A. 
207 Ibid. 
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protect personnel, their sources, and methods of gathering information and to 
preserve the ability to counter the attack plans of terrorists.” 
Discussion: Due to the variety of government agencies involved in this 
effort, there is a hesitancy to release such information without verifying and re-
verifying the potential threat for fear of being wrong, subject to public and political 
ridicule and weakening its legitimacy for future notifications to the public. It 
results in a delay of information to the general public who use the Internet and 
thus question why these organizations charged with our safety are even needed 
if they cannot furnish information in a timely and effective manner. The role of the 
U.S. news media also feeds into this when they highlight the abuses, thus 
reinforcing fear of government and fostering negative perceptions. 
(5) Upholding the Rule of Law.208 The USCS’ commitment to the rule 
of law is fundamental to supporting the development of an international, regional, 
and local order that is capable of identifying and disrupting terrorist attacks, 
bringing terrorists to justice for their acts and creating an environment in every 
country around the world that is inhospitable to terrorists and terrorist 
organizations. In order to accomplish this, the USCS promotes two actions: 
• Maintaining an Effective, Durable Legal Framework for 
Counterterrorism Operations209 
After 9/11, the United States was confronted with trying to legally counter 
a terrorist attack that had never happened before. Since then, the USCS has 
stated that a refined and applied legal framework is needed that ensures all 
counterterrorism activities are placed on solid legal footing. The challenge will be 
whether it can be flexible enough to adjust to the changing threat and 
environment.” 
Discussion: However, both houses of the U.S. Congress passed the 
controversial Military Commissions Act of 2006. The Act “establishes Military 
208Dilanian and Serrano, “Report: NSA Leaks Hurt Terror, Crime Fight.” 
209 Ibid. 
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Commissions, redefines U.S. obligations under Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Convention, strips detainees of their right to file habeas corpus pleadings, allows 
for evidence obtained by coercion or hearsay, and limits a defendant’s right to 
examine government evidence.”210 So to Muslims who were taught in American 
schools that even though Americans have their rights protected by the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, those rights can be suspended due to this Act, 
that is, “liberty and freedom for some.” 
• Bringing Terrorists to Justice211 
Successful prosecution of terrorists will continue to play a critical role in 
counterterrorism efforts, enabling the United States to disrupt and deter terrorist 
activities, gather intelligence from those lawfully held in U.S. custody, dismantle 
organizations by incarcerating key members and operatives, and gain a measure 
of justice by prosecuting those who have plotted of participated in attacks. The 
USCS also proposes to work with foreign partners to build their willingness and 
capacity to bring to justice suspected terrorists who operate within their borders. 
It also supports the notion that when other countries are unwilling or unable to 
take action against terrorists within their borders who threaten the United States, 
they should be taken into U.S. custody and tried in U.S. civilian courts or by 
military commission.” 
Discussion: After 9/11, the United States believed itself to be attacked by 
a unique and wholly different type of threat, and, so the argument went, “efforts 
to combat this new threat should be equally unique and should not be judged nor 
constrained by adhering to existing legal norms.”212“The United States then 
engaged in torture, cruel and inhumane treatment in the detention and prison 
facilities that they ran. Beginning in 2003, allegations of abuse of prisoners held 
210 Mark W. Vorkink and Erin M. Scheick, “The ‘War on Terror’ and the Erosion of the Rule of 
Law: The U.S. Hearings of the ICJ Eminent Jurist Panel,” Human Rights Brief 14, no. 1 (2006): 2–
6. 
211“Organization Description.” 
212Vorkink and Scheick, “The ‘War on Terror’ and the Erosion of the Rule of Law: The U.S. 
Hearings of the ICJ Eminent Jurist Panel.” 
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in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq surfaced, and by early 2004, the media released 
lurid, disturbing photos depicting U.S. military personnel abusing prisoners.”213 
The act presented a negative perception of the U.S. government. It portrayed the 
U.S. government in a vengeful and haughty light through their embarrassment of 
Muslims versus an appearance of seeking justice. This has caused Muslims, and 
many Americans, in the United States to be more disenchanted with their own 
government. 
b. Building Security Partnerships214 
“It is no secret that the United States cannot eliminate every terrorist or 
terrorist organization that threatens its safety, security, or interests. It must rely 
on and foster collaboration among key partners and allies to share the burdens of 
common security. To do this, the USCS proposes to”: 
(1) Accept Varying Degrees of Partnership.215 The United States along 
with its partners and allies are engaged in the full gamut of collaborative 
counterterrorism activities, from intelligence sharing to joint training and exercise 
to operations that counter radicalization to pursuing community resilience 
programs. It is advantageous working with countries that share the same 
common core values of the United States, have similar democratic institutions, 
and bring a long history of collaboration. However, in many cases the United 
States does not have that luxury and oftentimes must work with countries they 
have very little in common with except for the defeat of al-Qa’ida. Regardless, it 
is imperative that the United States build cooperation with these countries.” 
Discussion: However, while the United States is clamping down on civil 
liberties and fundamental freedoms, the world is watching them do it. It can have 
two effects on countries, and both are negative. First, some countries will see this 
213Vorkink and Scheick, “The ‘War on Terror’ and the Erosion of the Rule of Law: The U.S. 




                                            
hypocrisy, which could possibly lead more people to be sympathetic to those 
groups that the United States is fighting. Second, and possibly even worse, other 
countries may do similar things like the United States, believing that if the United 
States can justify it then they are permitted to do the same.  
From a domestic point of view, Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) groups 
have been created in every state to aid in the dissemination of intelligence to all 
groups in their respective state. However, they do not reach everywhere since 
many of the police departments are too small and cannot afford to send officers 
to the JTTF. In addition, much of the information is processed top down rather 
than bottom up, resulting in the front lines getting information slowly or the 
decision makers at the JTTF not getting “boots on the ground” information to help 
drive better policy and intelligence. In essence, a full-scale counter-radicalization 
program needs more than the police. PREVENT 2006 failed because it was too 
law-centric. However, it was corrected in PREVENT 2011 by bringing in 
organizations in fields, such as health, education, prison, and so forth. There are 
no efforts to bring these elements together in the United States. 
(2) Leveraging Multilateral Institutions.216 To counter violent extremists 
who work in scores of countries around the globe, the United States must draw 
the resources and strengthening activities of multilateral institutions at the 
international, regional, and sub-regional levels. The benefits are multiple: By 
working with these multilateral institutions, the United States can increase its 
engagement of partners, reduce the financial burden on the United States, and 
enhance the legitimacy of its counterterrorism efforts by advancing their 
objectives without a unilateral U.S. label. Through this effort, it avoids duplication 
and diluting its own or its partners’ counterterrorism efforts, recognizing that 
many of its partners have capacity limitations and cannot participate adequately 
across too broad a range of multilateral fronts.” 
216Vorkink and Scheick, “The ‘War on Terror’ and the Erosion of the Rule of Law: The U.S. 
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Discussion: The challenge of this effort is how U.S. institutions define 
terrorism and determine who the enemy is. The U.S. federal government claims it 
is fighting the War on Terror, but it lacks any real meaning “because one cannot 
engage in a war against a method (or means) of war.”217 Also, is there a timeline 
for this “War”? And is it only against al-Qa’ida, a non-state actor? Or should it be 
against those elements/forces that turn Americans toward supporting al-Qa’ida 
and carrying out its mission against the United States? Without these basic 
questions settled, how can partnerships with any institutions be made? 
c. Applying Counterterrorism Tools and Capabilities 
Appropriately218 
As stated earlier by President Barrack Obama’s Introduction to the 
National Strategy for Counterterrorism, “our terrorist adversaries have shown 
themselves to be agile and adaptive.” In response, the tools and capabilities 
should be just as equally agile and adaptive. The USCS proposed to accomplish 
this through” 
(1) “Pursuing a “Whole of Government” Effort.219 This bold claim 
advanced the notion of a rapid, coordinated, and effective counterterrorism effort 
that reflected the full capabilities and resources of the entire U.S. government. It 
envisioned that the capabilities and authorities of each department and agency 
ensured that the right tools are applied at the right time to the right situation in a 
manner that was consistent with U.S. laws.” 
Discussion: Though the DHS was created to provide a safer, more secure 
America by combining twenty-two different federal departments and agencies in 
2002, it still competes for intelligence against the FBI, DOD, all military branches, 
all intelligence agencies, all U.S. states, several large cities, “think tanks,” and 
private contractors. In fact, there is no document that coordinates any type of 
217Vorkink and Scheick, “The ‘War on Terror’ and the Erosion of the Rule of Law: The U.S. 




                                            
strategy that involves all of these groups. The U.S. government at every level 
(local, state, regional, and federal) as a whole even lacks basic messages 
targeted at vulnerable populations that all can agree on, thus resulting in lacking 
its own PREVENT strategy. There seems little current indication that any level of 
U.S. government can produce a domestic counter-radicalization strategy in 
America as wide ranging as PREVENT in the United Kingdom. 
(2) “Balancing Near- and Long-Term Counterterrorism 
Considerations.220 The defeat of al-Qa’ida must be accomplished without acting 
in a way that undermines the U.S. ability to discredit its ideology. America’s 
exercise of power against terrorist threats must be done in a thoughtful, 
reasoned, and proportionate way that enhances U.S. security and delegitimizes 
the actions of those who use terrorism. A balance must be attained between the 
costs and risks of action versus inaction that may have unintended 
consequences affecting the costs at a strategic level.” 
Discussion: A significant obstacle to any foreseeable solution is that the 
United States has no established scope, timeline, or reasonable way to measure 
its effectiveness. Without these issues defined, how are near and long term 
defined? In addition, America’s law enforcement exercises of power against 
terrorist threats have not been uniformly reasonable. For instance, in 2012, 
twenty-seven-year-old Ahmed Ferhani was sentenced to ten years for plotting to 
blow up synagogues and churches in New York. Ferhani had been 
institutionalized for psychiatric issues since he was seventeen years old. Yet, the 
NYPD used an undercover officer to befriend the broke, depressed, unemployed, 
and mentally unbalanced Ferhani and “tricked and coaxed him into a scheme 
that was completely initiated, constructed, and performed by NYPD agents 
preying on one Muslim man who they knew to be impressionable and in need of 
220Vorkink and Scheick, “The ‘War on Terror’ and the Erosion of the Rule of Law: The U.S. 
Hearings of the ICJ Eminent Jurist Panel, Washington College of Law Human Rights Brief,” 7. 
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help.”221“The Muslim community often refers to such law enforcement agency 
tactics as entrapment as far as the Muslim community is concerned. Another 
more current example is U.S. District Judge William Martini who dismissed a 
lawsuit against the New York City Police Department and said that the covert 
NYPD operation that sent undercover officers into area mosques to conduct 
surveillance on innocent Muslims was not unconstitutional. Essentially, this 
decision gives NYPD legal sanction to conduct targeted discrimination against 
Muslims.”222 
Ultimately, this war on terror has been too tactical from a military 
perspective, insufficiently political in its effect, and so lacking in its impact for 
protecting the United States from those citizens who see it specifically targeting 
the U.S. Muslim community. 
d. Building a Culture of Resilience223 
This principle seeks to strengthen the security and resilience of the United 
States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk 
to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, 
pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters. It seeks to accomplish this 
through:” 
(1) “Building Essential Components of Resilience.224 Based on the al-
Qa’ida’s belief that it can cause the United States to change its course in its 
foreign and national security policies by inflicting economic and psychological 
damage through terrorist attacks. To deny success to al-Qa’ida along this front 
means to demonstrate that the United States has and will continue to construct 
effective defenses to protect vital assets, whether they are critical infrastructure, 
221 “Mentally Ill Man Gets 10 Years In Prison For Plotting ‘Terrorist Attack,’” December 5, 
2012, http://rt.com/usa/sentence-terrorism-ferhani-york-357/. 





                                            
iconic national landmarks, or the U.S. population. However, to present the United 
States as a hardened target is unlikely to deter al-Qa’ida and its adherents and 
affiliates from attacking or abandoning terrorism, but it can deter them from 
attacking particular targets or persuade them that their efforts are unlikely to 
succeed.” 
Discussion: Unfortunately, there has not been any systematic effort 
carried out by the U.S. government to strengthen and secure critical 
infrastructure, iconic national landmarks, or the U.S. population. These efforts 
have been pushed down to the state level, with competitive grants as the only 
means of support. “While numerous studies and reports validate that these three 
groups need to be protected, funding has not been sent directly toward them. 
The only times U.S. efforts arise are in the aftermath of a natural disaster, such 
as Hurricane Sandy and the tornadoes in Oklahoma, and international relief 
efforts that the United States undertakes, such as Typhoon Hyain in the 
Philippines. But in the 2011 UK Strategy for Countering Terrorism, it incorporates 
both PROTECT (to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack) and 
PREPARE (to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack).”225 Should these two 
strategic strands be more closely linked in the United States? 
2. Four Guiding Principles of USCS 
In order for the previously-mentioned goals to be accomplished, the USCS 
specified more detailed and localized areas of focus, that is, areas of the world. 
The USCS believed that the highest rate of success would best be approached 
from a local perspective, such as USCS efforts to diminish specific drivers and 
grievances that al-Qa’ida exploits in its efforts to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize 
to violence from a regional and group-specific context. 
The areas of focus identified by the strategy are the Homeland, South 
Asia, Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, Europe, Iraq, Maghreb and Sahel, 
225 HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 
10. 
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Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Information and Ideas. All that are listed in the 
USCS are significant in that how the United States conducts itself in these parts 
of the world does affect the domestic diaspora. This research will however 
concentrate on “The Homeland” area of focus as what is described in the U.S. 
Counterterrorism Strategy (USCS). 
Discussion:“The Homeland226—Offensive efforts overseas to protect the 
Homeland have been complemented by equally robust defensive efforts to 
prevent terrorists from entering the United States or from operating freely inside 
U.S. borders. To support this defensive side of the equation, massive 
investments have been made in aviation, maritime, border security capabilities, 
and information sharing to make the U.S. a hardened and increasingly difficult 
target for terrorists to penetrate.” According to the USCS, these efforts must 
continue. “A counter response to this by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates involves them 
trying to identify operatives overseas (Underwear Bomber) and develop new 
methods of attack that can evade these U.S. defensive measures (photocopier 
machine bomb plot in 2010).”227 Another counter to these U.S. defensive 
measures is al-Qa’ida inspiring individuals to engage in terrorism on the U.S. 
homeland.  
While the USCS recognizes that al-Qa’ida is capable of inspiring 
individuals to engage in terrorism on the U.S. homeland, it lays out no strategy to 
counter it. Colleen LaRose aka “Jihad Jane” and the Tsarnaev brothers are prime 
examples of U.S. citizens who were inspired to commit terrorist attacks through 
radicalization via the Internet. Regardless of the hardening efforts by the U.S., 
domestic terrorists are agile and adaptive enough to overcome them. 
The USCS is cognizant that operating in the United States is different than 
any other country. First, the United States exercises sovereign control and can 
226 HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 
10. 




                                            
apply the full strength of the U.S. legal system, drawing on the capabilities of 
U.S. law enforcement and homeland security communities to detect, disrupt, and 
defeat terrorist threats. Second, in the USCS description of the Homeland, the 
capabilities and resources of state, local, and tribal entities serve as a powerful 
force multiplier for the Federal government’s counterterrorism efforts. It’s 
rationale for this statement is that as the domestic terrorist threat continues to 
evolve, the efforts to protect against those threats must also evolve. However, 
this evolution is not uniform for all those levels of U.S. government. This is partly 
due to the sheer number of different government bodies that make up the United 
States. In 2010 alone, there were 87,576 systems of government.228 
Coordination among them also involves jurisdictional issues, such as who would 
be in charge, as well as the lack of manpower, resources, and expertise. 
The United States has not had as much experience in dealing with 
terrorism as other countries. It has resulted in U.S. law capabilities not being as 
thoroughly developed as other countries. In fact, U.S. freedoms and rights of 
individuals (privacy, due process, habeas corpus, speech, etc.) have created a 
roadblock to develop the laws necessary to carry out this area of focus. The 
second point of this area is also misleading about the force multiplier. It assumes 
federal, state, local, and tribal entities all are on the same page, are willing to 
share information, are uniform, and work together. It is a notion that has not been 
fostered nor exercised to make this statement true enough to be effective. 
• Information and Ideas: Al-Qa’ida Ideology, Messaging, and 
Resonance 
Information and ideas as presented in the USCS refer to the global 
communications via the Internet and media that al-Qa’ida utilizes. Through these 
mediums, al-Qa’ida’s calls for violence and instructions for carrying it out are 
within easy reach of millions of individuals who may or may not come to 
sympathize with or actively support al-Qa’ida, even if they have little or no formal 
228 Douglas F. Morgan et al., “Recovering, Restoring and Renewing the Foundation of 
American Public Administration: The Contributions of Herbert J. Storing,” Public Administration 
Review 70, no. 4 (July/August 2010): 621. 
 77 
                                            
contact with them. In order to counter this, the “USCS proposes reducing the 
traction and space for al-Qa’ida, reducing its resonance, and contributing to what 
it fears most—irrelevance.”229 
However, there has been no strategy outlined or carried to reduce the al-
Qa’ida message to irrelevance. As stated earlier, there are many agencies 
(federal, state, local, civilian contractor, etc.) conducting their own war against 
terrorism, and all are not in synch with each other let alone with any type of 
unified message(s). “The only organization that has been on record of providing 
some type of counter message to al-Qa’ida is the U.S. Center for Strategic 
Counterterrorism Communications; a tiny and ineffective agency staffed by 12–
15 people according to some critics.”230 
3. Conclusion 
The USCS as outlined in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism (June 
2011) represents the culmination of the United States experience with terrorism 
overseas since 9/11. It is acknowledged that al-Qa’ida continues to be a group 
that is agile and adaptive and that the United States must be just as equally 
adaptive and agile. The United States has learned that the effort will take the 
committed involvement and collaborative efforts of all U.S. government agencies.  
The research proposes that a counterterrorism response needs to focus 
on a number of aspects that strike a balance between protecting national 
interests abroad and dealing with the political realities at home. The U.S. 
government must recognize the role of local communities because, if engaged 
positively, they can play a key role in protecting U.S. interests and providing 
more effective counter radicalization at the targeted groups. Without robust 
counter-narrative work and effective counterterrorism-informed community 
229 Morgan et al., “Recovering, Restoring and Renewing the Foundation of American Public 
Administration: The Contributions of Herbert J. Storing,” 621. 
230 Shaun Waterman, Social networks used to counter al Qa’ida: Team Tries to Impede 
Jihadi Recruiters,” The Washington Times, October 5, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
news/2011/oct/5/social-networks-used-to-counter-al-qaeda/. 
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policing, there is a risk that in the future homegrown terrorists will become even 
more prevalent and much more lethal.  
The next chapter will discuss how federal engagement with the 
communities, increased law enforcement, government expertise in countering 
violent extremism, and the promotion of American ideals can act as a counter to 
al-Qa’ida’s ideology. These factors should serve as the basis of the U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy, which can lead to developing counter-radicalization 
programs and improving strategic counterterrorism communications. 
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V. PROPOSAL AND ELEMENTS OF A U.S. PREVENT 
STRATEGY 
“Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more 
terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are 
recruiting, training, and deploying against us?”231 
–Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to bring together the elements and 
considerations discussed in previous chapters and to present an outline of a U.S. 
domestic counter-radicalization strategy with recommendations on how this 
strategy should be implemented. The U.S. domestic counter-radicalization 
strategy proposed will be based on U.S. and UK domestic terrorism experiences 
and the unique challenges faced by U.S. domestic counterterrorism agencies. 
Utilizing the UK’s Executive Summary June 2011 Summary Headings, the 
chapter shall outline a U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy “by 
considering the context, guiding principles, objectives, and delivery of such a 
strategy.”232 Essentially, the discussion will consider the implementation issues 
which will need to be explored, what those issues involve, what role the federal 
government should play, which agency would head this strategic effort, how the 
program would be funded within the federal budget, and how “success” can be 
measured. 
Before a strategy can be proposed, it first must be acknowledged that a 
U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy is an effort that is an entirely new 
front for the United States This program requires a different mindset. The United 
States cannot simply use past national strategic efforts and simply add a counter-
radicalization section to it. Just as the United Kingdom realized, the United States 
231 Michael Jacobson, “Learning Counter Narrative Lessons from Cases of Terrorist 
Dropouts,” in Countering Violent Extremism, ed. Erik Akerboom (Breda, The Netherlands: 
KoninklijkeBroese&Peereboom, 2010), 73.  
232 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, 1. 
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must acknowledge and accept that counter radicalization is, in fact, a stand-
alone, independent operation worthy of separate analysis and execution. It will 
require the intra-departmental efforts of various U.S. federal agencies and 
departments on a significant scale. It will also be a program where the fruits of its 
efforts may not be immediately felt and not realized until much later. 
B. CONTEXT OF A U.S. PREVENT STRATEGY 
The United States, like the United Kingdom, faces a range of terrorist 
threats both domestic and internationally. The most serious threat is from al-
Qa’ida, its affiliates, and likeminded organizations. These groups also seek to 
radicalize and recruit people within America to their cause. While the percentage 
of Americans who are prepared to support violent extremism in the United States 
is small, it is significantly higher among young people. During the last decade, 
the United States has acquired knowledge about radicalization. It has gained 
experience regarding the factors that encourage people to support terrorism, and 
then for those radicalized individuals to carry out the terrorism-related activity. 
Therefore, it becomes imperative to understand these factors so as to prevent 
radicalization in order to minimize the risks it poses to U.S. national security. 
Based on this understanding, the United States can develop the basis of the U.S. 
domestic counter radicalization strategy. 
As stated in Chapter III, “radicalization is driven by an ideology which 
sanctions the use of violence by propagandists for that ideology here and 
overseas.”233 The ideology seems both attractive and compelling to some based 
on personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors. Evidence also reinforces the 
notion that support for terrorism is associated with the rejection of a cohesive, 
integrated, multi-faith society based on democracy. Efforts to address 
radicalization will aggressively, therefore, depend on developing a sense of 
belonging to this country and support of U.S. core values. 
233 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, 1. 
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C. GUIDING PRINCIPLES: A FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. DOMESTIC 
COUNTER RADICALIZATION STRATEGY 
The U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy must be guided by 
principles that are consistent with U.S. domestic policy. The principles selected 
must be of a domestic nature and applicable to the proposed method that will 
carry it out. They must also be understood at a local level. 
Based on the UK’s Executive Summary Headings from 2011, the following 
principles are proposed to frame the U.S. domestic counter-radicalization 
strategy: 
• PREVENT strategy should be an equal, if not, greater part of the 
overall U.S. counterterrorism strategy, with the number one aim to 
stop U.S. citizens from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.  
Discussion: As mentioned in Chapter I, the United Kingdom recognized 
the importance of the PREVENT strategy which was one of the four core areas of 
their entire CONTEST strategy. The other three core areas being PURSUE: to 
stop terrorist attacks; PROTECT: to strengthen protection against a terrorist 
attack; and PREPARE: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack.234 The U.S. 
domestic counter radicalization strategy recognizes that radicalization will be a 
significant component, recognizing the complex causes of radicalization within 
the overall national counterterrorism strategy.  
• The U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy should address 
the threat of radicalization from environmental groups to 
international groups. It should also prioritize according to the threat 
level that these groups pose to the U.S. national strategy.  
Discussion: This is based on the fact that the United States deals with a 
variety of terrorist groups, such as animal rights and environmental groups, White 
supremacist groups, and the 1,360 “patriot” extremist groups235 discussed in 
Chapter IV. Complicating matters are the supremacist and patriot groups that 
oftentimes target those who are of different color, country of origin, and worship 
234 HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism. 
235 Carmichael, “Anti-government Extremist Groups Reach Record Levels, Say Experts.”  
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differently as the source of the problems caused by the U.S. government’s 
unresponsiveness. Race (hate) crimes generated from some of these groups 
often furthers radicalization against the U.S. government from the perpetrators 
and the victims. The perpetrators feel that the United States is not doing enough 
to protect its quality of life from people of different backgrounds, and the victims 
feel that the United States is not doing enough to ensure their protection against 
these groups. 
• The U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy effort will require 
the balancing of privacy rights, civil liberties, and civil rights versus 
countering the terrorist messaging that seeks to radicalize 
individuals.  
Discussion: However, as mentioned in Chapter IV, the U.S. government 
has a longstanding history of unacceptable intrusion of government into 
Americans’ lives. This means that it has to carefully explain the strategy to the 
U.S. public. It will obviously be controversial and cause debate among many 
groups, such as the media, civil rights groups, minority groups, think tanks, 
political parties, etc. It therefore becomes imperative that the U.S. domestic 
counter radicalization strategy have a clear and vetted message on its purpose 
and the specific means on how it will carry out its purpose. This is where the 
CSCC, currently located in the U.S. State Department, can take the lead to 
provide explanation to the domestic audience. 
• The U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy will depend on a 
successful integration strategy. It must not, however, assume 
control of or allocate funding to integration projects, which have a 
value far wider than security and counterterrorism as stated in 
Chapter III. This is in response to a lesson learned in the UK 
PREVENT strategy where such efforts created the impression that 
the UK government was supporting cohesion projects only for 
security reasons and, in effect, securitizing integration. 
Discussion: The U.S. PREVENT strategy must not be used as a means 
for covert spying on U.S. citizens or communities. This was an accusation the 
United Kingdom faced within their 2006 PREVENT strategy as mentioned in 
Chapter III, and it undermined its effectiveness and legitimacy resulting in a 
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revised version, the 2011 PREVENT strategy. This principle will be a challenge 
because as stated in Chapter IV, the United States is currently depicted as being 
hypocritical in its respect of human rights. Efforts must be taken to provide a 
higher level of transparency to bring legitimacy to its labors. 
• The U.S. PREVENT strategy will be built on a commitment to 
localism, where communities and local authorities will have a key 
part in this strategy. In Chapter IV, the National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism proposed a “whole government effort” but only at 
the federal level with a ‘trickle down’ effect on state and local 
governments.  
Discussion: It is proposed here that local government be the main delivery 
system of the U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy, with the federal 
government as a support. The approach is similar to the national policy in dealing 
with natural disasters. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
utilizes the policy that “all disasters are local” meaning that it is the local 
jurisdiction’s responsibility to handle the disaster first. If the local jurisdiction 
needs assistance, they seek assistance from the state. And if the state needs 
assistance, they appeal to the federal government, i.e., FEMA.  
• The DHS will fund the U.S. domestic counter radicalization 
strategy. DHS would administer grants to local communities and 
groups that seek to implement programs to address those social 
factors that could potentially lead to radicalization. The principle will 
tap into local communities’ identification of efforts that will foster 
counter radicalization since they are closer to those groups 
targeted for radicalization by terrorist groups.  
Discussion: As mentioned in Chapter V, the City of Minneapolis works with 
the Somali Youth Group and Broward County, Florida’s Sheriff’s Office “Uniting 
Broward” Initiative are examples of efforts that would be eligible for grant funding 
to reach out to groups targeted for radicalization. In Chapter II, the UK PREVENT 
2006 sought to counter radicalization by working with communities and the public 
and private sectors to address wider issues through the Faith Communities 
Capacity Building Fund to help improve opportunities and strengthen society by 
reducing inequalities, especially those associated with faith and race. It included 
taking action to help the Muslim community improve their educational 
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performance, employment opportunities, and housing conditions. Another effort 
was the Commission on Integration and Cohesion. Its goal was to consider how 
local areas themselves play a role in forging cohesive and resilient communities. 
And, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Global Opportunities Fund was 
created to address the political and socio-economic environment that extremists 
exploit. Its goals were to support the development of effective, accountable 
governments; democratic institutions; and the promotion of human rights.”236 The 
U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy can help support these same types 
of UK organizations by providing grants that incentivize local communities to 
emulate what these UK organizations accomplished. 
• The U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy must be aligned 
with domestic priorities and avoid being involved in overseas 
counterterrorism efforts. While it is said, “what happens over there, 
impacts what happens here,” the strategy must not get bogged 
down in the foreign policy rhetoric. It must be cognizant of the 
realities of what happens “over there” and be prepared to respond 
immediately and with conviction.  
Discussion: The CSCC would take the lead on this effort by presenting the 
U.S. position fairly and openly. In fact, the CSCC should encourage discussion 
among the different groups that may feel impacted by the action. It would 
demonstrate that the United States is aware and cognizant of opposing views. By 
inviting such discussion, it would mitigate and/or diffuse resentment as opposed 
to ignoring/not addressing the action. However, any more than that will deviate 
from the strategy’s goals. As mentioned in Chapter III, the UK’s 2011 PREVENT 
Strategy sought “to address this issue through better communication of the UK’s 
security and foreign policies to rebut claims made about them and challenge 
terrorist ideologies.”237   This has come in the form of the creation of the RICU 
that was established in the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home 
Office in 2007. Its function is “to coordinate government communications about 
the terrorist threat and the UK’s response to it and facilitate and generate 
236 Carmichael, “Anti-government Extremist Groups Reach Record Levels, Say Experts.” 
237HM Government, Prevent Strategy, 8.23.. 
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challenges to terrorist ideology and the claims made by terrorist groups.”238 
“RICU has had a central role in developing counter-ideological or counter-
narrative work.”239 However, its impact has been variable due to its lack of 
precision around target audiences and messages. It has been a struggle to 
analyze its impact and evaluate its effectiveness. Regardless, through the UK’s 
PREVENT 2011 strategy, RICU has implemented programs and evaluative 
techniques to better measure its effectiveness. RICU’s U.S. counterpart, the 
CSCC just mentioned (and mentioned in Chapter I) is located within the U.S. 
State Department. It is similarly tasked with the same goals, but is unfunded, 
understaffed and works more internationally. The CSCC proposed here would be 
more domestic oriented.  
D. OBJECTIVES OF THE U.S. PREVENT STRATEGY 
Extracted from the 2011 UK PREVENT Strategy, the U.S. counter 
radicalization strategy should address objectives that, 
• “respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat the 
United States faces from those who promote it;”240 
• “prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure they 
are given appropriate advice and support;”241 and 
• “work with sectors and institutions that are familiar with the risks of 
radicalization that need to be addressed.” 
1. Objective One: The Ideological Challenge 
All terrorist groups have an ideology they promote via the Internet to 
facilitate radicalization and recruitment. The U.S. domestic counter radicalization 
strategy must challenge and disrupt the ability of terrorists to promote their 
extreme ideology. According to the rationale behind the development of the UK 
strategy discussed in Chapter III, “previous work in this area had made some 
238 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, 8.28-8.29. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Ibid, HM Government, Prevent Strategy, 3.21 
241 Ibid. 
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progress but had not consistently reached the few people who were most 
susceptible to terrorist propaganda. Their strategy had failed to recognize the 
way in which terrorist ideology makes use of ideas espoused by extremist 
organizations and had not fully understood the implications.”242 They had not 
effectively engaged and/or used the influence and reach of communities and 
community groups. In fact, previous UK PREVENT work had sometimes given 
the impression that “Muslim communities as a whole were more “vulnerable” to 
radicalization than other faith or ethnic groups.”243 
The current U.S. experience in countering terrorist ideology is being 
carried out by several U.S. and local agencies, such as the DOD, State 
Department, and the DHS. They have tasked themselves with providing their 
own strategic communication to terrorist propaganda as discussed in Chapter IV. 
While they may see the importance of countering the terrorist propaganda, they 
do not follow a U.S. accepted, universal counter messaging strategy and their 
work mainly targets international audience with little domestic effort.  
In fact, just recently, “the State Department has finally taken to ratcheting 
its efforts for an English-speaking audience with its Center for Strategic 
Counterterrorism Communications’ latest YouTube satire of the “Welcome to the 
‘Islamic State’ land (ISIS/ISIL).”244 The State Department parodies the group’s 
recruitment that promises followers will learn “useful new skills,” such as “blowing 
up mosques” and “crucifying and executing Muslims” by imposing phrases and 
terms on the screen, such as “Travel is inexpensive because you won’t need a 
return ticket!” and ends with the words “Think again, turn away.”245 
However, some social scientists question a strategy that showcases 
violence and death caused by groups like the Islamic State. Such publicity on the 
242 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, Objective One: Challenging the ideology that 
supports terrorism and those who promote it, Summary. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Matt Hansen, “U.S. Boosts Propaganda War with Islamic State,” Sun-Sentinel, 
September 8, 2014. 
245 Ibid. 
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U.S.’s part can motivate some Americans to actually participate in terrorism. In 
fact, Hansen states, “previous government antiterrorism outreach efforts had 
fallen into similar patterns where challenging a young adult with the fact that 
something might be difficult and challenging might excite them to take part.”246 In 
response, the U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy must make the 
consequences of participating seem dire and undesirable in the worst possible 
way. It will require solid coordination between the DHS and the State 
Department. It will need to develop the type of counter-ideological or counter-
narrative work performed by the UK’s RICU. 
Much more needs to be done in this critical area. The U.S. domestic 
counter radicalization strategy effort must be proportionate and focused. It must 
not pass judgment on faith or to suggest only a particular kind of faith is 
appropriate or acceptable. This was one of the criticisms of the UK’s 2006 
PREVENT Strategy mentioned in Chapter III. What is critical is that this effort 
must be in conjunction with local domestic communities. They are often better 
able than the federal government itself to disprove the claims made by terrorist 
groups and to challenge terrorist and associated extremist ideologies. 
The British successful implementation of this objective “will require better 
communication of government security and foreign policies to rebut the claims 
made about [U.S. actions]; more projects in education, communities, and the 
criminal justice system to enable the understanding of and challenge to terrorist 
ideology; and support for experts where ideology draws on and misrepresents 
theology and requires a detailed response.”247 
2. Objective Two: Supporting Vulnerable People 
At an individual level, there are many theories that explain why/how an 
individual becomes radicalized. The main theme of the UK PREVENT strategy as 
246 Ibid. 
247 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, Objective One: Challenging the ideology that 
supports terrorism and those who promote it, Summary. 
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well as that of the proposed U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy is to 
address radicalization before it takes root in an individual. The objective therefore 
is to intervene through crime prevention programs to prevent vulnerable people 
from being drawn into terrorist-related activity. However, the U.S. domestic 
counter radicalization strategy must avoid what the 2006 UK PREVENT strategy 
experienced in using this delivery method. When first used by the United 
Kingdom, “they had been accused of using these programs to restrict free 
speech and for spying.”248  “If properly implemented, these programs should 
identify those people/groups at risk for radicalization and provide the relevant 
support. This can only happen with the expertise of policing, local authorities, and 
community organizations tasked with providing services to vulnerable people 
because they are in a position of great influence. The elements exist but a 
counter radicalization program needs to be implemented to coordinate this 
effort.”249 These organizations can be created in any forward-looking state or city 
that wishes to undertake the effort under the auspices of a mayor’s office (city) or 
governor’s office (state). To reach those vulnerable populations in all parts of the 
United States, the DHS would create a national grant program that encourages 
cities, counties and states to reach out to vulnerable populations through 
innovative methods unique to their local situation and similar to what the United 
Kingdom created. 
3. Objective Three: Working with Key Sectors 
While progress has been made, more must be done to match the level 
and effort of individuals and groups bent on the radicalization of U.S. citizens. To 
accomplish this, “the U.S. must be committed with the resolve and resources to 
not let “ungoverned spaces” go unchallenged in which extremism is allowed to 
flourish and, where appropriate, to counter it by legal intervention.”250 
248 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, 3.15. 
249 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, Objective Three: Supporting sectors and institutions 
where there are risks of radicalisation, Summary. 
250 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, 10.1. 
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As stated in Chapter V, there is a wide range of sectors helping to prevent 
people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. How the U.S. federal 
government can support these efforts will be the key to the success of a U.S. 
domestic counter radicalization strategy. The United States must implement 
support systems to those key priority areas of education, health, economics, 
criminal justice, faith, charities, and the Internet that all play a role in the cure of 
U.S. domestic radicalization. Support of these key sectors would be those federal 
agencies, such as the Department of Education, the Department of Health & 
Human Services, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Justice. 
Leading the strategy would be the Department of Homeland Security and the 
CSCC to coordinate counter messaging that can be modified for local 
communities.  
However, since the U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy involves 
efforts from a variety of different departments, the appointment of a Counter-
Radicalization Czar in DHS would be appropriate. The CR Czar would have the 
authority to cross departmental jurisdictions and mandate cooperation and 
support from these departments in support of U.S. counter-radicalization efforts. 
To avoid accusations that the strategy is a masquerade to spy on vulnerable 
groups, the czar must not be connected with law enforcement. The czar should 
have a varied professional background in government and/or business, and 
possibly be a member of one of the vulnerable groups.  
E. PREVENT DELIVERY: IDENTIFY FUNDING SOURCES (OR HOW TO 
IMPLEMENT PREVENT IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET) 
In order for the U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy to be 
successful, it must be placed within the DHS to ensure effective coordination, 
oversight, and accountability. From here, the strategy would be coordinated to 
develop and implement the three objectives just discussed. Using a well-thought-
out and well-monitored grants program, the DHS would support those local 
communities who wish to address counter radicalization in their communities. 
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One of the critical criteria of the funding would be that while the role of 
policing is critical to the U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy, it must not 
become a police program. As a lesson learned from the 2006 UK PREVENT 
experience, the United States must establish successful partnerships with 
organizations in those key priority areas discussed earlier with local policing. 
Funding, therefore, can be divided between two key areas: local authority work in 
association with communities, and policing. Through the grant program, local 
communities must be able to implement local initiatives to manage local 
radicalization.  
1. How Can U.S. PREVENT Strategy Success be Measured? 
It is a fact that what gets measured gets talked about, worried about, and 
acted on. While the UK PREVENT strategy and current U.S. counterterrorism 
plans discuss local/community-based efforts, they strictly rely on qualitative data, 
(i.e., interviews or subjective perceptions of who may become radicalized, what 
triggers it, and how to deal with it). Regardless, they both lack any concrete data 
that may identify those individuals or groups who may be experiencing 
radicalization tendencies and the effect of programs to dissuade them from 
supporting terrorism. 
It is no surprise that it is difficult to measure if a program has had a 
positive impact on a person to persuade them from supporting terrorism. In fact, 
the 2011 UK PREVENT strategy states that evaluation and performance 
monitoring have been weak and must be improved.251 This was because of 
inadequate data collection. Therefore, it makes it that much more difficult to 
understand what the funding has been used for and/or what impacts the projects 
have had. 
The U.S. domestic counter radicalization strategy must then develop, 
maintain, and utilize performance measures first. Essentially, the strategy must 
develop an endgame to what the strategy is to achieve and by what means it will 
251 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, Guiding Principles: A Framework for Prevent, 6.71. 
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accomplish its objectives and goals. This will require an examination of other 
similar domestic social programs as well as those outside of the United States. 
Once established, the performance standards can be included as a condition of 
their counter radicalization grants program. Outcomes, or performance 
measures, of the U.S. PREVENT strategy would be the use of local matrices and 
figures that would show fewer complaints, fewer drug busts, and less juvenile 
delinquency. 
2. Conclusion 
After 9/11, the United States has made drastic efforts and committed 
major resources to fight the war on terrorism. The United States has developed 
the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011, the National Security 
Strategy, May 2010, the Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, December 2011, 
and, to a lesser extent, a counter-strategic communications plan. However, all 
are geared toward international terrorism and with the federal government as the 
lead.  
The United States has not truly developed and/or implemented a counter-
radicalization plan to handle a new kind of domestic enemy. This is an enemy 
that may not be seen until it is far too late. However, all the signs of radicalism 
may have been obvious in retrospect, becoming sympathetic to terrorist ideology 
over a period of time, the radicalized U.S. citizen. Therefore, the United States 
needs to develop a counter radicalization strategy similar to the one developed 
by the United Kingdom that is implementable at the local level, supported at the 
federal level and targets those groups that terrorists seek to persuade to join and 
support their cause. 
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